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Synopsis
Revenue Management (RM) is the practice of managing perishable assets by control-
ling their availability and/or prices with an objective to maximize the total revenue.
Seat inventory allocation falls in the purview of quantity-based RM. The liberaliza-
tion of the aviation sector and the subsequent entrance of the low-cost carriers saw
an ever-increasing customer base for the airline industry. Given the large number of
buyers, ﬁrms were free to decide the price at which they would sell tickets. The low-
cost carriers started to follow a third degree price discrimination and segmentation
of the market, charging a higher price to the market with a relatively inelastic demand.
Although a lot of work has been done in the area of seat inventory allocation under
a monopolistic market scenario, we realized that not a lot of work had been done in
a competitive market scenario. This thesis considers the problem of seat inventory
allocation and pricing in a duopoly where each of the competing airlines have two fare-
classes. We consider the possibility that the same fare-class may be priced diﬀerently
by the two competing airlines and allow for the overﬂow of passengers between the
airlines in the same fare-class. In the ﬁrst part of our work, we develop a non-linear
mathematical model for setting the booking limits for one of the two competing air-
lines such that the revenue earned is maximized. We consider overﬂow of passengers
from one airline to another in the same fare-class in response to a price diﬀeren-
tial and compare the results obtained from our model with the standard Expected
Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) model under a monopolistic scenario. The results
show that our model gives higher revenues than that obtained from the EMSR model.
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In the second part of our work, we consider a non-cooperative game between
two competing airlines with price cutting as the strategy to increase their demand.
Through numerical computations, we identify the pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
From the results, we conclude that Nash equilibrium is achieved only when both the
airlines follow the same pricing strategy indicating that individual price cutting will
not be beneﬁcial. This also indicates that unless the competitors enter into a coop-
erative coalition with each other, they would not beneﬁt from deep discount oﬀers.
In the third and ﬁnal part, we prove theoretically the existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in a two airline, two fare-class problem with price sensitive overﬂow
of customers in the same fare-class that was computationally analysed earlier. The
strategy / strategies at which Nash equilibrium is achieved are identiﬁed. We show
that Nash equilibrium is only achieved when both the airlines price identically. Hence,
our thesis concludes that diﬀerential pricing does not hold any signiﬁcance for the
competing airlines from an operational perspective.
Publications
1. Chandra Sen Mazumdar and R. Parthasarathy, Seat allocation and pricing in
a Duopoly - a theoretical perspective, 2014 POMS International Conference,
Singapore, July 2014.
2. Chandra Sen Mazumdar and R. Parthasarathy, Seat Allocation and Pricing in
a Duopoly in the Airline Industry, International Journal of Revenue Manage-
ment, Vol. 8 (1), pp. 2033, 2014.
3. Chandra Sen Mazumdar and R. Partasarathy, Seat Inventory Allocation under
Competition in the Airline Industry, 15th Annual International Conference of
Society of Operations Management, IIM Kolkata, India, December 2011. Was
awarded the Best Paper Presentation Award.
vi
Keywords
Revenue management, duopoly, diﬀerential pricing, seat allo-
cation, passenger overﬂow, Nash equilibrium.
vii
Notations
Variables :
x is the decision variable that denotes the booking limit of Class 2 fares for airline i;
akn, k = i, j;n = 1, 2 denotes the number of Class n requests accepted by airline k;
aOv,kn , k = i, j;n = 1, 2 denotes the no. of overﬂow requests from airline k accepted
by the other airline in Class n;
Parameters :
Dkn, k = i, j; n = 1, 2 denotes the demand for Class n of airline k;
pkn; k = i, j;n = 1, 2 denotes the fare price for Class n of airline k;
pkn; k = i, j;n = 1, 2 denotes the threshold price above which customers from airline i
(j) overﬂow to airline j (i) in class n;
Mkn denotes the market share for Class n of airline k;
C denotes the airline capacity;
and c1, c2 are constants.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Revenue Management (RM), also called Yield Management (YM), is a practice of
managing perishable assets by controlling their availability and/or prices with an
objective to maximize the total revenue. Talluri and van Ryzin, 2005 [43] categorizes
demand-management decisions into three basic classes:
• Structural decisions: This decision deals with which selling format to use (such
as posted prices, negotiations or auctions); which segmentation or diﬀerentiation
mechanism to use; which terms of trade to oﬀer (including volume discounts and
cancellation or refund options); how to bundle products and so on.
• Price decisions: This deals with how to set posted prices, individual-oﬀer prices,
and reserve prices (in auctions); how to price across product categories; how to
price over time; how to markdown (discount) over the product lifetime and so
on.
• Quantity decisions: This deals with whether to accept or reject an oﬀer to buy;
how to allocate output or capacity to diﬀerent segments, products or channels,
when to withhold a product from the market and sell at later points in time
and so on.
1
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The authors state that which of these decisions is most important in any given
business depends on the context. The timescale of the decisions vary as well. Struc-
tural decisions are normally strategic decisions taken relatively infrequently. While
quantity-based RM is mostly practiced in the airline industry, price-based RM is usu-
ally practiced in the retail industry. Seat inventory allocation falls in the purview of
quantity-based RM.
According to Talluri and van Ryzin, 2005 [43], in the United States, the starting
point of RM was the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. This act loosened control of
airline prices, which was earlier strictly regulated based on standardized price and
proﬁtability targets. Passage of the act led to rapid change and a rush of innovation
in the industry. Established carriers were now free to change prices, schedules, and
service without the approval of the U.S. Civil Aviation Board (CAB). At the same
time, this deregulation brought many low-cost airlines into the market. These low-
cost ﬂiers could proﬁtably price much lower than the major airlines because of their
lower labor costs, simpler operations and no-frills service.
The Indian aviation sector was also characterized with a high degree of Govern-
ment control prior to 1990. As reported by an article in November, 2005 [48], the
liberalization of the Indian aviation sector in 1990 allowed private sector players to op-
erate as air taxi operators. In 1994, following the repeal of the Air Corporations Act,
private carriers were permitted to operate scheduled services and granted scheduled
carrier status upon fulﬁllment of certain applicable criteria. The advent of no-frills
airlines in the U.S. and Europe and the subsequent revolution witnessed therein in
the aviation sector, generated interest for no-frills airlines in Asia as well. The ﬁrst
low-cost carrier in India was Air Deccan which started its civil aviation services in
August, 2003.
The liberalization of the Indian aviation sector and the subsequent entrance of
the low-cost carriers started seeing an ever-increasing customer base for the airline
industry. Given the large number of buyers, ﬁrms were now able to decide the price
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at which they would sell tickets. As reported in a study by Dhawan et. al [13], in
the airlines sector, ﬁrms go in for third degree price discrimination and segment the
market, charging a higher price to the market with a relatively inelastic demand (such
as fares between business and economy class travellers, or between emergency travel
and leisure travel by providing apex fares). The low cost airlines follow this diﬀeren-
tial pricing strategy. Customers booking early with carriers such as Air Deccan will
normally ﬁnd much lower prices if they are prepared to commit themselves to a ﬂight
by booking early, on the justiﬁcation that consumer's demand for a particular ﬂight
becomes more inelastic the nearer to the time of the service.
Diﬀerential pricing brings with it two immediate advantages: 1) It encourages the
price sensitive customer, who would have otherwise traveled by train or not traveled
at all, to travel by air, and 2) it allows the regular-fare airlines to maintain a compet-
itive image in the face of the low-fare carriers. However, to dissuade customers who
are willing to pay a higher price from purchasing low-fare tickets, the airlines imposed
certain service restrictions and booking limits on the lower fare-class. The diﬀerential
pricing strategy brought with it the challenge of how to allocate seat to each of the
fare-classes such that the revenue earned could be maximized. On one hand, the
airlines want to avoid ﬂying aircrafts with empty seats by introducing the reduced
fares. On the other hand, they do not want the higher fare-class passengers to be
displaced by the lower fare-class ones. Thus a balance needs to be established where
the booking limit for lower fare-class customers would have to be determined ﬁrst.
During the booking process, the low-fare class seats would be made available before
the high fare-class seats and once the booking for low fare-class seats was closed, they
would not be reopened again. In Seat Inventory Control (SIC) literature, this rule is
conventionally known as the low-before-high or LBH rule. Thus, SIC may be deﬁned
as the practice of limiting the number of seats made available to diﬀerent fare-classes
that share a common cabin on an aircraft with the objective to balance the number
of passengers in each fare-class in order to maximize total revenues.
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Most of the published literature on SIC deals with a monopolistic market scenario.
According to a report by Steen and Sorgard [42], the theory of price discrimination is
primarily concerned with a monopolistic market. The report shows how versioning is
applied in a monopoly. Versioning here refers to the diﬀerently priced tickets that are
made available to consumers. The authors also question the eﬀect of versioning in a
competitive scenario. The authors conclude that price discrimination is important in
the airline industry even in a competitive scenario.
In a competitive market scenario where carriers are free to ﬁx the prices oﬀered
to customers in the various fare-classes, another issue could be the poaching of pas-
sengers from the competitor by pricing the same fare-class, which provides the same
fare-restrictions, at a lower price than the competitor. Extant literature considers SIC
involving the migration of customers due to capacity-restrictions. From experience,
we have seen that, in a competitive scenario, competitors try to undercut on each
other's prices to earn a higher revenue or secure a greater market share for themselves.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the eﬀect of such price discrimination and
hence the best pricing strategy has not been studied in extant literature.
The strategies involved in complex games is studied in Game theory. Almost every
human interaction be it in politics, law, religion, economics or day-to-day life, can be
modeled as a game. When the players in a game agree to work in partnerships, it
is known as a Cooperative game. In a Non-cooperative game, the players compete
with each other and each is looking after his or her own interests. The concept of
Nash equilibrium states that even in complex non-cooperative games, there exists an
equilibrium where no side would beneﬁt by changing its course. At this equilibrium,
each side knows its adversary very well and sticks to its strategy. By showing that
every game has at least one such equilibrium point, John Nash Jr. helped business
strategists,politicians and law makers make more sense of the world around. There
can also be multiple equilibria in a game. The simplicity of Nash equilibrium enabled
the growth of game theory as a legitimate discipline and enabled strategists and reg-
ulators to better model their environments.
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This thesis studies a scenario where competing airlines operate the same ﬂight
leg, each having two fare-classes. It aims to simultaneously deal with the problems of
seat inventory allocation between diﬀerent fare-classes and the pricing strategies to be
followed in this scenario. It also studies the migration of customers from one airline
to another based on price sensitivity. We determine the booking limits at which the
revenue earned is maximized and the competitors achieve Nash equilibrium.
1.2 Thesis objectives
Given the above motivation, we started delving into the literature related to SIC.
We noted that not much of the extant work in this area considered the competi-
tive market scenario and even fewer studied the impact of pricing on seat allocation
between the diﬀerent airline classes. Our thesis attempts to tackle, simultaneously,
the problem of seat inventory allocation and pricing in a duopoly where each of the
competing airlines have two fare-classes. We consider the possibility of similar fare-
class to be priced diﬀerently by the two competing airlines and allow for overﬂow of
passengers between the airlines in the same fare-class. Our work was done in 3 phases.
In the ﬁrst phase, we developed a non-linear mathematical model with the objec-
tive to maximize the revenue earned by one of the airlines, airline i, considering the
overﬂow of passengers, within the same fare-class, from airline j to airline i, when
either of the two fare-classes of airline j is priced higher than airline i. We solved the
mathematical model and obtained the maximum revenue earned by airline i at diﬀer-
ent prices and the corresponding seat allocation. We compared the results obtained
from our model to the results from the standard EMSR model under monopolistic
market assumption and showed that the revenue earned in a competitive scenario was
distinctly higher than in a monopolistic scenario.
Next, we considered that both airlines i and j followed four diﬀerent pricing
strategies for its two classes and allowed for overﬂow of passengers within the same
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fare-class from airline j to i and vice versa. In such a scenario, we found the optimal
booking limits using the non-linear model developed earlier and determined the rev-
enue earned by airline i and consequently calculated the revenue earned by airline j
at the diﬀerent prices. We then determined the point at which a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium was achieved when each of the two competing airlines adapted any one of
the four pricing strategies. We showed through extensive numerical experimentation
that a Nash equilibrium is achieved only when both the competitors operated at the
same price.
In the third phase, we showed, theoretically, that Nash equilibrium can only exist
when both the airlines have the same prices although they may follow two or more
diﬀerent pricing strategies.
1.3 Organization of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we give a detailed discus-
sion of the existing literature emphasizing on that pertaining to the airline industry,
concluding with the identiﬁed research gaps and a description of our problem. Chap-
ters 3, 4 and 5 provide the details of the three parts of our work, as explained earlier.
Finally we conclude by providing future research directions in this area in Chapter
6.
Chapter 2
RM in the airline industry
2.1 Introduction
The problem of RM has attracted several scholars and airline companies the world
over for more than 30 years. According to Raza and Akgunduz, 2008 [35], the RM
literature can be broadly classiﬁed into the following four branches,
1. Demand forecasting
2. Overbooking
3. Seat inventory control
4. Pricing
These four issues, though distinct, are closely related. Today RM work is not just
limited to the airline or retail industry. RM practice is also prevalent in industries
like the internet providers and broadcasting companies. A comprehensive overview of
literature related to airline RM can be found in Mc Gill and van Ryzin, 1999 [29]. For
an overview of literature related to RM in diﬀerent industries, the interested reader
may refer to Chiang et al., 2007 [10].
With the deregulation of airline prices and the advent of discount fares, it became
necessary to control the booking limit for discount seats which would consequently
7
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lead to the calculation of the protection level for the full-fare seats. Scholars inter-
ested in airline RM, and the airline companies realized early on that eﬀective control
of discount seats would require detailed tracking of booking histories, expansion of
information system capabilities, and careful research and development of seat inven-
tory control rules. In the following three sections we will very brieﬂy discuss the
literature related to forecasting, overbooking and pricing respectively and later give
a more detailed overview of seat inventory control literature. The organization of the
literature review is shown in Figure 2.1.
2.1
In
tro
d
u
ction
9
Figure 2.1: Schema of literature review
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2.2 Forecasting
Forecasting is a critical aspect of revenue management, especially in the airline in-
dustry where it has a direct impact on booking limits which in turn determine airline
proﬁts. The complexities of customer behavior makes forecasting for airlines rather a
diﬃcult issue. An eﬃcient forecasting mechanism for airline demands is quintessential
for accurate booking limit calculations leading to revenue maximization. According
to Zeni, 2001 [51] forecasting for airlines is complicated since the past data are often
censored and do not provide a true picture of historical demand data. Once an air-
line stops selling tickets for a particular fare-class due to limits set by the RM system,
it also stops collecting data of future demands and hence gives rise to censored data.
Various unconstraining methods exist, ranging from simplistic ones that discard all
censored observations to complex ones that calculate the value of true demand via
the Expectation-Maximization algorithm.
From the literature, demand forecasting can be further classiﬁed into (i) models
for demand distribution; (ii) models for arrival process; (iii) uncensoring demand data
and (iv) aggregate and disaggregate forecasting. Some of the major work done in this
area are by Beckmann and Bobkowski, 1958 [1], Belobaba, 1987a [2], Lyle, 1970 [26],
Shlifer and Vardi, 1975 [41], Sa, 1987 [39], Lee, 1990 [19], McGill, 1995 [28] and many
others. Zaki, 2000 [50] gives a summary of forecasting for airline revenue management.
Weatherford and Pölt, 2002 [47] use methods of unconstraining bookings to demand
to improve forecasting accuracy for airlines. Neuling et al., 2004 [32] present the
opportunities of using passenger name records (PNR) as a data source to improve
forecasting accuracy and use a machine learning algorithm as the prediction model to
address PNR-based no-show forecasting. Lemke, 2010 [20], in his PhD thesis, shows
the potential of a combination of forecasting models on certain datasets. The author
says that forecast combinations do not provide satisfactory results in certain datasets
and cannot be generalized for a particular domain. This is probably due to the
higher probability of a changing data generation process in case of longer forecasting
horizons, lack of stability of the low level data and other missing characteristics that
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hinder generalizability.
2.3 Overbooking
Publications on forecasting in the airline industry are concurrent with the litera-
ture on overbooking since overbooking calculations depend on predictions of ultimate
demand, cancellations, and no-shows. Most of the early technical research on air-
line overbooking aimed at controlling the probability of denied boardings within the
limits set by airline management or external regulating bodies. Some of the early
work in this area are by Thompson, 1961 [46], Taylor, 1962 [45], Rothstein and
Stone, 1967 [38], Martinez and Sanchez, 1970 [27] and Littlewood, 1972 [25]. Roth-
stein,1968 [37], in his Ph.D. thesis, describes the ﬁrst dynamic programming (DP)
model for overbooking and validates the results of test runs of the model at American
Airlines. Brumelle and McGill, 1989 [7] present a static formulation of the overbook-
ing problem and show that it is a special case of a general model of the two fare-class
seat allocation problem. In his dissertation, Chatwin, 1993 [9] deals exclusively with
the problem of overbooking and provides a number of new structural results. Karaes-
man and van Ryzin, 2004 [17] address the problem of jointly setting overbooking
levels when there are multiple inventory classes that can serve as substitutes for one
another.
2.4 Pricing
There is an extensive literature on airline pricing from an economic perspective which
deals with pricing and price competition at an industry level rather than from an op-
erational, revenue management perspective. Among the literature that is relevant
to strategic and marketing decisions that are important in revenue management are
Kretsch, 1995 [18] which describes fare management policy from a managerial stand-
point, Dana, 1998 [12] which explains the price dispersion as a competitive market
reaction to consumers' uncertainty about travel and the risk of rationing due to ca-
pacity constraints. Oum et al., 1993 [34] and Oum et al., 1996 [33] deal with aspects
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of pricing in deregulated airline markets and the inﬂuence of code-sharing agreements
on international fares. To the best of our knowledge, recent literature that consid-
ers simultaneous pricing and seat allocation are Xiao et al., 2007 [49] and Raza and
Akgunduz, 2008 [35]. Xiao et al.,2007 [49] considers a semi-dynamic pricing and
seat allocation approach for a single airline which generates near-optimal revenues.
Raza and Akgunduz, 2008 [35] studies the horizontal fare-pricing between two com-
peting airlines. In the ﬁrst part they show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists
for pricing when the booking limits are pre-committed. In the second part, they
numerically study the fare-pricing competition along with a nested control on book-
ing limits. However, the authors do not prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in
the non-cooperative game studied numerically. Sen Mazumdar and Ramachandran,
2011 [40] consider the problem of revenue maximization and seat inventory allocation
for an airline in a duopoly with diﬀerential pricing of tickets between the competi-
tors. Through numerical analysis, they show that the revenue earned by airline i
in a competitive scenario where overﬂow of customers from the competing airline is
considered, is consistently more than what is calculated by EMSR in a monopolistic
scenario. Also, the booking limits for lower fare-class in a monopolistic scenario is
always higher than that obtained in competition. They also show that as the price
diﬀerential between airline i and j increase, more overﬂow passengers from Class 1
of airline j are accommodated in airline i and hence the booking limit for Class 2
passengers in airline i decreases. This problem and the results obtained are discussed
in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
2.5 Seat inventory control
Airline seat inventory control is the practice of limiting the number of seats made
available to diﬀerent fare-classes that share a common cabin on an aircraft. The
objective of airline seat inventory control is to balance the number of passengers in
each fare-class in order to maximize total revenues. The early literature in this area
considers a monopolistic market with two or more fare-classes which are diﬀerentially
priced.
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2.5.1 Seat inventory control under monopoly
The most important early works center around the development of the expected
marginal revenue analysis techniques, like those by Littlewood, 1972 [25], Belobaba,
1987b [3] and Belobaba and Weatherford, 1996 [4]. As mentioned by Tan, 1992 [44]
in his Master's thesis, these methods are utilized in many heuristic approaches to the
problem and include many highly restrictive assumptions.
Seminal work in the area of seat inventory control has been done by Littlewood,
1972 [25] of BOAC (now, British Airways) who proposed that discount fare bookings
should be accepted as long as their revenue value exceeded the expected revenue of
future full-fare bookings. This simple two-fare, seat inventory control rule, known
as Littlewood's rule, marked the beginning of Yield Management (YM) which later
came to be known as Revenue Management (RM). Littlewood's rule is extended to
multiple fare classes in Belobaba, 1987b [3] with the introduction of the term expected
marginal seat revenue (EMSR). For more than two fare-classes, EMSR is essentially
Littlewood's rule applied sequentially in increasing fare order. The method is optimal
only for two fare-classes. EMSR calculates protection limits that are too conservative
which means that it will reserve too many seats for the higher fares, thereby rejecting
too many low-fare bookings. This drawback of EMSR was addressed by Belobaba and
Weatherford, 1996 [4] who proposed EMSRb which is a simple heuristic that produces
close to optimal results under certain conditions. EMSRb aggregates demand instead
of aggregating protection levels as in EMSR. Belobaba andWeatherford, 1996 [4] show
that EMSRb is consistently within 0.5 percent of the optimal solution, while EMSR
under certain conditions can deviate more than 1.5 percent from the optimal solution.
Brumelle and McGill, 1993 [8], Curry, 1990 [11], Robinson, 1995 [36], and Wollmer,
1992 [14] resolved the basic issue of ﬁnding optimal nested booking limits under the
existing forecasting archetype of estimating the total demand to come. All of these
results require to make the following assumptions: 1) sequential booking classes; 2)
low-before-high fare booking arrival pattern; 3) statistical independence of demands
2.5 Seat inventory control 14
between booking classes; 4) no cancellations or no-shows (hence, no overbooking); 5)
single ﬂight leg with no consideration of network eﬀects; and, 6) no batch booking.
Brumelle and Walczak, 2003 [6] studied the dynamic nature of the RM problem with
multiple demands. Bertsimas and Popescu, 2003 [5] studied the seat allocation prob-
lem in a ﬂight network and proposed an approximate dynamic programming approach
for network RM.
2.5.2 Seat inventory control under competition
The early seat inventory control literature considers a monopolistic market. It is note-
worthy that not until 2005 was there any published research considering the notion
of competition. The paper by Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31] may be considered
as a pioneering work in this area. We begin this section with a detailed discussion of
certain papers that consider seat inventory control under competition. These papers
are also more relevant to our problem context and help us in developing the model
for our problem. After providing the background of our problem context, we carry
on to give a detailed problem deﬁnition.
Extant literature on seat inventory control in a competitive scenario consists of a
working paper by Li and Oum, 1998 [21] which provides a preliminary analysis of the
seat allocation problem for two airlines competing with identical aircraft and fares on
a single-leg route. Zhang and Cooper, 2005 [52] address the simultaneous seat inven-
tory control of a set of parallel ﬂights between a common origin and destination with
dynamic customer choice among the ﬂights. They solve this stochastic optimization
problem through simulation based techniques.
Ideally, a seat inventory allocation problem in the airline industry would consider
that two or more airlines would be competing with each other and operating the same
ﬂight-leg (i.e. same origin to destination) within the same time interval and oﬀering
two or more fare-classes for customers to choose from. The number of fare-classes
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in the competing airlines may not be identical and the arrival process of customers
would be dynamic instead of following the LBH rule. LBH rule states that low fare
customers arrive before high fare customers and once booking for low fare tickets is
closed they are not reopened again. The competitor's fares for similar fare-classes
may be same or diﬀerent from each other. Extant literature considers that customers
do not buy-up or buy-down in either their preferred airline or in a competitor's airline
i.e. even if customers shift their loyalty from their ﬁrst choice airline to one of the
competitors, they buy in the same fare-class and not in a lower or higher fare-class.
However, in reality, a customer might exhaustively consider all the options available
to him and then choose to purchase in any airline and in whichever fare-class he thinks
is most suitable for his needs. The ticket prices for a particular fare class could be
diﬀerent for diﬀerent airlines i.e. pij 6= pik 6= pim . . ., where i is the booking class and
j, k,m . . . are the diﬀerent airlines. However, as seen later in this chapter, published
literature considers no price diﬀerential between fares in identical fare-classes of com-
peting airlines. In a real world situation, there may be cancellations and no-shows
by passengers and competing airlines may have limited demand and sale information
about each other. We now proceed to discuss the problem features considered in
papers that are more closely related to the problem that we propose to study. These
are the papers by Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31], Li et al., 2007 [22], Li et al.,
2008 [23] and Gao et al., 2010 [16].
The features that Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31], Li et al., 2007 [22], Li et al.,
2008 [23] and Gao et al., 2010 [16] have in common are:
• They consider only two competing airlines.
• They consider that these two competing airlines have only two fare-classes for
its customers to choose from.
• These papers consider that the customer arrival follows the conventional LBH
rule.
• They consider that the prices for low fare and high fare tickets for the diﬀerent
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airlines is the same i.e f iL = f
j
L and f
i
H = f
j
H , where i and j are the two airlines
and L and H stand for low and high-fares respectively.
• Buy-up or buy-down is not considered.
• Cancellations is not considered.
In addition to the above features, Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31] and Gao et
al., 2010 [16] share the common trait that both consider overﬂow of passengers from
one airline to the competing airline in the same fare-class in case of non-availability
of tickets in the customers' 1st preference airline. Li et al., 2007 [22] and Li et al.,
2008 [23] do not consider overﬂow of passengers. Although the market demand has
been characterized quite diﬀerently in the three papers mentioned here, Netessine and
Shumsky, 2005 [31], Li et al., 2007 [22] and Li et al., 2008 [23] share the commonality
that in all these papers demand is characterized by probability distributions. In Gao
et al., 2010 [16], however, the authors consider limited demand information and do
not characterize the demand by any probability distributions. They explore diﬀerent
demand scenarios where the upper and lower bound demand values are known. Since
the consideration of overﬂow of customers is an important feature of these problems,
we can further classify these papers into two groups, those that consider overﬂow and
those that do not.
2.5.2.1 Seat inventory control under competition with passenger overﬂow
Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31] studies both horizontal competition i.e. when two
airlines compete for passengers on the same ﬂight leg and vertical competition i.e.
when diﬀerent airlines ﬂy diﬀerent legs on a multileg itinerary. Although Li et al.,
2007 [22], Li et al., 2008 [23] and Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31] characterize
demand as a probability distribution, the former two consider the rather restrictive
assumption that the known market demand is split using the randomized rationing
rule. Also, unlike Lippman and McCardle, 1997 [24] who start with an aggregate
market demand, Netessine and Shumsky,2005 [31] assume a ﬁrm speciﬁc demand
which if unmet overﬂows into a market demand serviceable by all ﬁrms. They show
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that under the assumption that the demand distribution is totally positive of order
2 (TP2), there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium under horizontal competition
and under vertical competition when connecting demand is restricted to the high-
or low-fare classes. Through numerical experiments, they go on to show that the
monopolists' booking limits (allowable seats at the discount fare) is never smaller
than the sum of allowable discount sales of competing airlines in case of horizontal
competition. They also conclude that competitive equilibrium booking limits may be
higher, or lower, under vertical competition, although in a two-airline, two-leg case
they tend to be higher. In case of vertical competition, the authors go on to describe
a set of revenue-sharing contracts to coordinate the booking limit decisions of two
airlines with connecting passengers.
In addition to all the features considered in Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31], Gao
et al., 2010 [16] consider limited demand information and uses worst case analysis fo-
cused on the regret criterion. They also study a centralized scenario that considers
the seat inventory allocation problem for an airline that operates two ﬂights from an
origin to a destination, departing within minutes of each other. Similar to Netessine
and Shumsky, 2005 [31], they consider independent demand with overﬂow of passen-
gers between the competing airlines in the same fare-class. One distinct feature of
this model is that unlike the other related literature, they do not characterize demand
as a probability distribution or a stochastic process. Instead, they consider all the
demand scenarios. Each demand scenario is represented by two input sequences, one
for each ﬂight where an input sequence consists of a ﬁnite stream of fare requests
during the booking horizon. Ik for k = 1, 2 has been used to denote the input se-
quence for ﬂight k. To limit the number of scenarios and to incorporate some demand
information into the analysis, the authors use demand bounds. It is assumed that the
airlines know the lowest and the highest number of customers whose ﬁrst preference
is airline i (j) on that route. The authors note that the upper- and lower-bound
information for each ﬂight can easily be obtained through judgmental forecasts or
other estimation methods. They also mention that the lower-bound demand, Lkn and
the upper-bound demand, Ukn in Class-n for ﬂight k (n = 1, 2; k = i, j) can be easily
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obtained if the minimum and maximum market size for that route is estimated and
the airlines know the estimated fraction of customers whose 1st preference is airline
i (j). In this paper the authors use regret criterion to obtain policies that come with
worst-case guarantees. Regret measures the eﬀectiveness of a policy by benchmarking
it to the performance of the oine optimal action that is determined with perfect,
hindsight information. The authors address the following issues in this paper: (i) to
make fare-class allocation decisions for new business with limited data under com-
petition in an eﬃcient and computationally eﬃcient way; (ii) competitive fare-class
allocation decision using regret criterion; (iii) the scenarios which lead to worst-case
performance for an airline under a competitive setting and why; (iv) whether cen-
tralized planning can improve worst-case performance. The conclusions drawn in this
paper are the following: (i) a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists when the
number of fare-classes is restricted to two even when more than two airlines compete
on the same route provided that demand is shared among the airlines in a determinis-
tic manner; (ii) the equilibrium booking limits for the competing airlines can be very
diﬀerent from the centralized solution - when the two airlines (ﬂights) are equivalent
in capacity, fare structure and market share, competition favors the high-fare class
and allocates fewer seats to the lower-fare class whereas more seats are allocated to
the lower-fare class in the route level in case of the centralized solution. This result
also shows that the average price of an airline seat is higher under competition; (iii)
this study shows that the regret criterion and distribution-free methods are tractable;
(iv) the main strength of this paper lies in its use of limited demand information. This
method is suitable in cases where the demand distribution or the arrival process can-
not be accurately characterized or when the decision maker is concerned about the
worst-case performance rather than averages.
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2.5.2.2 Seat inventory control under competition without passenger over-
ﬂow
Li et al., 2007 [22] discuss seat allocation under competition when each of the two
airlines is operating a single leg ﬂight with two fare classes (full and discount). Sim-
ilar to Lippman and McCardle, 1997 [24], they assume that both the airlines are
competing for a share of a common market and use a randomized rationing rule for
seat splitting. The authors here consider an added level to Lippman and McCardle,
1997 [24] by modeling demand for two product classes. Unlike Netessine and Shum-
sky, 2005 [31] and Gao et al., 2010 [16], the authors here do not consider overﬂow
of customers between the airlines. Akin to most seat allocation research, this paper
develops a static formulation where the airlines set a booking limit and once the sale
of discounted tickets is closed, it's not reopened. The authors show that there exists
an equilibrium booking strategy such that both airlines will protect the same number
of seats for the full fare and the total number of seats available for the discount fare
under competition is smaller than the total number of seats that would be available if
the two airlines collude. These ﬁndings are validated by a numerical example, which
further illustrates the impact of capacity shares between two airlines and the level of
positive dependency between two fare classes.
Li et al., 2008 [23] examines a classical seat allocation problem in a duopoly, with
two fare-classes, where the cost structure between the competing airlines may be dif-
ferent. Contrary to Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31], the authors here consider a
common market demand for both the airlines and not a segmented market demand
that is segmented at both ﬁrm level and class level. They examine the seat allo-
cations and the existence of N.E. for both a horizontal competition case and for a
centralized scenario where the competing airlines work in collusion. They conclude
that when the capacity and cost are perfectly symmetric, the seat protection for the
full fares results in a Prisoner's Dilemma for the two airlines. For both sequential
and simultaneous seat allocation scenarios, they show the existence of a pure strategy
N.E. in both horizontal and centralized cases. The authors provide valuable insights
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into the protection levels when the seat allocations are done diﬀerently. Though, this
paper considers a diﬀerential cost structure between the competing airlines, they do
not model a price-based overﬂow of customers from one airline to the other.
2.6 Research Gap
We have discussed here in detail the literature in the domain of RM with emphasis
on the airline industry. It may be noted that considerable research had been done
in all the subareas of this domain. However, the extant literature on seat inventory
control in a competitive scenario lacked any literature on the eﬀect of diﬀerential
pricing on the booking limits and consequently on the revenue earned by the airlines
with a consideration for customer preference. Also, the overﬂow of customers from
one airline to the other, as considered by Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31] and Gao
et al., 2010 [16], has been on the basis of capacity constraints rather than on the
basis of price diﬀerential. Thus, the following research gaps were identiﬁed in extant
literature:
• Study of the impact of diﬀerent pricing strategies on the booking limit and
revenues earned by competing airlines, when the demand is segmented.
• Consideration of customer overﬂow based on price diﬀerential rather than on
capacity constraints.
In this thesis, we determine the booking limits and the impact of diﬀerential
pricing on the revenue earned by two competing airlines, each of which oﬀer two fare-
classes to the customers. We study a case of horizontal competition where the com-
peting airlines ﬂy a single ﬂight leg between the same origin and destination points,
with aircrafts departing within minutes of each other. We formulate our problem in
a Game theoretic framework. Theoretically and through numerical computations, we
show the existence of pure strategy NE for this problem scenario.
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2.7 Problem deﬁnition
The characteristics of the problem and the assumptions have been described in detail
in this section and also through Figure 2.2
Figure 2.2: Two airline competition with two fare-classes and overﬂow
The main features of our problem are:
• We consider a duopoly i.e. two competing airlines only.
• Each airline consists of two fare-classes only.
• We model a static realization of the simultaneous seat allocation and pricing
problem.
• We consider that the demand is segmented at the ﬁrm level and at the class level
for the individual airlines. Thereby, incorporating the phenomenon of customer
choice.
• Price diﬀerentiation in the same fare-class between the competing airlines is
considered, i.e. pin 6= pjn, where n = 1, 2 represent the high-fare and low-
fare classes respectively of a particular airline and i, j represent the competing
airlines.
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• Overﬂow of passengers is considered. When the price of tickets in their 1st
choice airline is higher than a pre-deﬁned threshold price, then the customers
overﬂow to the other airline in their preferred booking class i.e. the customers
are driven away by increasing prices.
• Buy-up or buy-down is not considered.
• Cancellations are not considered.
We make the following assumptions:
• There are no other ﬂights operating within this time-frame for the same route
and both ﬂights have the same capacity.
• If all passengers who overﬂow cannot be accommodated by the competitor, then
the passengers do not return to the higher priced airline but are lost.
• A ticket purchased at either fare gives access to the same product viz. a coach-
class seat on one ﬂight leg.
• The service restrictions placed on the low-fare tickets is the same for both the
airlines.
• The two ﬂights oﬀer the same fare structure and appeal to the same market.
• Demand for both the airlines in a particular fare-class is the same.
• The market is equally shared by the competitors.
Chapter 3
Development of non-linear
mathematical model and comparison
with EMSR
3.1 Introduction
In the ﬁrst phase of the thesis, the booking limit decision problem is mathematically
modeled as a non-linear program that maximizes the revenue earned by one of the
two competing airlines, airline i. The mathematical model is based on the problem
deﬁnition mentioned in section 2.7.
However, before going into our model, we would like to discuss the general develop-
ment of an optimization model and deﬁne the terms used in relation to single-resource
capacity control (SRCC) problems in RM. So, in the next section we will be providing
the general discussion about RM models and give deﬁnitions, followed by a section
on deﬁnition and development of our Mathematical model. We will then carry on
to the numerical computations related to our model and the comparison with EMSR
techniques, followed by a conclusion for this Chapter.
23
3.2 Single resource capacity control (SRCC) in RM 24
3.2 Single resource capacity control (SRCC) in RM
Optimal allocation of capacity to diﬀerent demand classes is known as single re-
source capacity control in RM parlance. Capacity allocation in airlines for an origin-
destination (OD) problem falls under this category of RM problems. In contrast to
this are multi-resource capacity control problems which deal with the network capac-
ity control problems in the airline industry. Since our problem deals with capacity
control for a single leg i.e. an OD problem, we will be discussing here only about
SRCC.
3.2.1 Control mechanisms
Some of the control mechanisms used in SRCC and also frequently appearing in our
thesis are booking limits and protection levels.
3.2.1.1 Booking limits
Booking limits are controls that designate the amount of capacity that can be sold to
a particular class of passengers at a given time. So, if we have a total capacity of 50
in an airline and specify the booking limit for Class 2 passengers to be 20, then no
more than 20 passengers will be allowed to book Class 2 tickets in the said airline.
Thus, even though the airline has further capacity, this will be closed to subsequent
Class 2 passengers. The rest of the capacity will be protected for the Class 1 or higher
class passengers. Booking limits may be partitioned or nested.
• Partitioned indicates that the booking limits are compartmentalized and even
if the demand for that class is less than what has been ﬁxed, that demand
cannot be utilized by another class of passengers. Thus if the booking limit for
Class 2 passengers is 20 but the demand is less than 20, then the rest of these
seats remain empty and cannot be made available to Class 1 passengers.
• Nested indicates that the capacity is available to all classes in a hierarchical
manner. So in a two-class situation, if the total capacity is 50 and the booking
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limit is 20, then the entire 50 seats are available to the Class 1 passengers but
the number of Class 2 passengers cannot exceed 20. If the demand for Class 2
is less than 20, then the available capacity is assigned to a Class 1 passenger, if
required.
3.2.1.2 Protection levels
Protection level indicates the number of seats to be reserved or protected for a par-
ticular class or set of classes. Protection levels can also be partitioned or nested.
• A partitioned protection level is equivalent to a partitioned booking limit. So,
a partitioned booking limit of 20 for Class 2 is equivalent to protecting 20 seats
for Class 2 in a partitioned scenario.
• A nested protection level means that capacity is deﬁned for sets of classes, in
a hierarchical class order. So, continuing with our`earlier example, we can say
that the protection level for Class 1 is 30 and that for Classes 1 and 2 combined
is 50. Hence, no more than a capacity of 30 can be assigned to Class 1 and so on.
If, booking limit = bj, total capacity = C and protection level = yj, then the
relationship between them can be written as,
bj = C − yj (3.1)
3.2.1.3 Bid prices
Contrary to protection levels and booking limits that are class-based controls, bid
prices are revenue-based controls. A bid-price control sets a threshold price, based on
remaining capacity or time, and bookings are accepted only if the revenue generated
from it exceeds this threshold price and is rejected otherwise. Bid price controls are
simpler than protection level or booking limit controls because the former only re-
quires to store a single threshold value whereas the latter two require the knowledge
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of the capacity for each of the classes. However, the data for the available capacity,
remaining time and the bid price itself need to be updated after each sale. If however,
the threshold for the bid price remains static instead of being updated after each sale,
then there is the risk that all available capacity goes to a particular class only where
the revenue obtained is higher than the set threshold. For this reason some critics of
this method call it unsafe.
Sometimes though, a set of products may be clustered in a particular class and an
average price charged for the entire class. In class-based control, a request from any
of the products in that class may be accepted or rejected depending on the revenue
maximization policy. However, if individual prices are known for all the products,
then bid price control allows to selectively accept only those requests that garner a
higher revenue. This could be seen as one of the advantages of the bid price control
mechanism.
3.2.2 Earlier models
In this section we discuss some of the earlier models that were developed to deal with
the SRCC problem. All these models consider a monopolistic scenario. Hence, all
the calculations are made with respect to a particular airline operator only and not
for competing airlines. We begin with Littlewood's rule which is a single class model,
continuing to n-class models, concluding with some of the prevalent Heuristic and
optimal models used in literature.
3.2.2.1 Littlewood's rule
As mentioned earlier, seminal work in the area of SRCC was established by Little-
wood, 1972 [25]. He proposed that for a two-class scenario, discount fare bookings
should be accepted as long as their revenue value exceeded the expected revenue of
future full-fare bookings. This simple two-fare, seat inventory control rule came to
be known as Littlewood's rule. Mathematically this can be represented as,
3.2 Single resource capacity control (SRCC) in RM 27
p2 ≥ p1P (D1 ≥ x) (3.2)
where, p1 and p2 are the prices associated with the higher and the lower classes re-
spectively, such that p1 > p2,
D1 is the Demand for Class 1,
and x is the capacity remaining to be booked.
Hence equation 3.2 indicates that suppose x units of capacity is remaining and
there is a demand for a lower fare-class booking. If we accept that request, we earn
an amount of p2. However, if the Class 2 demand is not accepted then it is sold to
Class 1 if and only if D1 ≥ x. Thus, the expected marginal value for reserving the xth
unit for Class 1 is equivalent to p1P (D1 ≥ x). Also, as mentioned in the deﬁnition
above, the Class 2 request is accepted if the revenue obtained from it exceeds the
expected marginal value of future full-fare bookings.
Since the right hand side of equation 3.2 is diminishing in x, there will be an
optimal protection level denoted by y∗1 such that we accept Class 2 requests if the
remaining capacity exceeds y∗1 and reject it otherwise. Thus,
p2 < p1P (D1 ≥ y∗1) and p2 ≥ p1P (D1 ≥ y∗1 + 1) (3.3)
Assuming that a continuous distribution, F (x), is used to model demand, the
protection level y∗1 can be written as,
p2 = p1P (D1 > y
∗
1) or y
∗
1 = F
−1
1
(
1− p2
p1
)
(3.4)
Equation 3.4 gives an optimal value for the protection level of Class 1. The optimal
booking limit can be derived from this as,
b∗2 = C − y∗1 (3.5)
where, C is the total capacity.
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3.2.2.2 n-Class models
The n-Class models, as the name suggests, considers those problems where the num-
ber of fare-classes, n > 2. It assumes that the demand for the n classes arrive in
n stages, with classes arriving in increasing order of revenue value i.e. following the
low-before-high rule. The prevalent method used for n-Class models is the Dynamic
programming (DP) formulation.
The problem is formulated with the classes corresponding to the diﬀerent stages
of a DP with the remaining capacity, x being the state variable. For a particular
state, j, the model assumes the occurrence of the following events:
i) The realization of the demand, Dj occurs and its value is observed.
ii) It is decided to accept a quantity u of this demand such that u ≤ x. The optimal
control u∗ is therefore a function of the stage j, the capacity x and the demand
Dj i.e. u
∗ = u∗(j, x,Dj).
iii) The revenue pju is obtained and the program steps into the start of stage j − 1
with a capacity of x− u.
The above sequence of events assume that the decision for accepting u∗ is made
after knowing the demand value of Dj. However, in reality the demand arrives se-
quentially and the control decision has to be made without knowing Dj a priori.
However, as we will show below, the optimal decisions do not use the prior knowledge
of Dj and hence this assumption is not restrictive.
Let Vj(x) denote the value function at the start of stage j. Once the value of Dj
is observed, the value of u is chosen to maximize the revenue of the current stage plus
the revenue to go, i.e.
pju+ Vj−1(x− u),
subject to the constraint 0 ≤ u ≤ min(Dj, x). The value function entering stage j,
Vj(x) is then the expected value of this optimization with respect to the demand Dj.
Hence, the Bellman equation is,
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Vj(x) = E[max(pju+ Vj−1(x− u))] (3.6)
with boundary conditions, V0(x) = 0, x = 0, 1, . . . , C.
The value of u∗ that maximizes the right hand side of equation 3.6 for each j and x
gives an optimal control policy for this model.
3.2.2.3 Heuristics
Although it is not diﬃcult to use the exact methods for SRCC, heuristics have been
more popularly used for this job. As mentioned earlier, RM gained popularity after
the Airline Deregulation Act in the USA in 1978. At that time, only Littlewood's
rule was available to practitioners for SRCC. During the decade after RM gained
popularity, these heuristics became embedded into RM software, gaining popularity
and familiarity among the practitioners. This is the reason that use of heuristics still
remain popular. Heuristics are also used because they are simpler to code, quicker
to run and provide results that are, in many cases, very close to the optimal. Here
we will discuss the two most popular heuristics based on the n-class, static, single
resource model deﬁned in Section 3.2: EMSRa and EMSRb, the development of both
of which have been attributed to Belobaba [ [3], [4]].
EMSRa
EMSRa, also known simply as EMSR, is the most well-known heuristic although
EMSRb provides better revenue performance. For more than two fare-classes, EMSRa
is essentially Littlewood's rule applied sequentially in increasing fare order. Let us
consider the stage j+1 for which demand of class j+1 arrives with price, pj+1. We are
interested to compute the capacity available for the remaining classes i.e. j, j−1, . . . , 1
and the protection level, yj, for classes j and higher.To do so, we consider a single
class k from among the remaining classes, j, j − 1, . . . , 1, and compare it with j + 1
in isolation. For every combination of k and j + 1 we compute the protection level
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using Littlewood's rule given in equation 3.4,
P (Dk > y
j+1
k ) =
pj+1
pk
(3.7)
Repeating for each future class k = j, j− 1, . . . , 1, we could similarly compute the
capacity to be reserved for each such class k in isolation. The approximate protection
level, yj for classes j and higher would then be the cumulative protection levels of
these individual classes and given by,
yj =
j∑
k=1
yj+1k (3.8)
where yj+1k is given by equation 3.7. This step is then repeated for each stage j.
The disadvantage of EMSRa was that it was very conservative and sometimes
calculated protection levels that were higher than optimal. This gave rise to EMSRb
which avoids the lack-of-pooling defect of EMSRa.
EMSRb
EMSRb is the most widely used heuristic method in RM. Belobaba and Weatherford,
1996 [4] show that EMSRb provides revenues that are consistently within 0.5 percent
of the optimal solution, while EMSRa under certain conditions can deviate more than
1.5 percent from the optimal solution. EMSRb is also based on an approximation
method that reduces the problem in each stage to two classes. However, contrary
to EMSRa, instead of aggregating protection levels, EMSRb aggregates the demand.
Suppose again that we are in stage j + 1 and we want to calculate the protection
level, yj. Then we begin by aggregating all future demand for classes j, j − 1, . . . , 1,
Sj =
j∑
k=1
Dk (3.9)
and the weighted-average revenue can be calculated as,
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pj =
∑j
k=1 pkE[Dk]∑j
k=1E[Dk]
(3.10)
Using Littlewood's rule (3.4), the protection level yj is,
P (Sj > yj) =
pj+1
pj
(3.11)
Rearranging equation 3.11 gives,
y∗j = F
−1
j
(
1− pj+1
pj
)
(3.12)
where Fj(x) is a continuous function used to model demand with mean µj and variance
σ2j . The EMSRb clearly captures the statistical averaging eﬀect that is lacking in
EMSRa and this its advantage over EMSRa. As mentioned earlier, it also provides
more near-optimal results than EMSRa.
3.2.2.4 Optimal models
The optimal models are those that provide a mathematical formulation and provide
exact results for booking limits or protection levels. The linear programming (LP)
method is most commonly used in these cases and the demand is modeled to be deter-
ministic or as a stochastic arrival process. As mentioned in Section 2.5.1, these models
all required six basic assumptions of 1) sequential booking classes; 2) low-before-high
fare booking arrival pattern; 3) statistical independence of demands between booking
classes; 4) no cancellations or no-shows (hence, no overbooking); 5) single ﬂight leg
with no consideration of network eﬀects; and, 6) no batch booking. The relevant
literature associated with this class of models has been discussed in Chapter 2.
It may be noted that all the above models, except a few mathematical optimization
models, consider a monopolistic scenario and the protection levels and revenues are
calculated for a single entity which, in our case, is the airline. In contrast, our
problem is to ﬁnd the booking limit or protection level and hence the revenues earned
by competing airlines. The model proposed in this thesis provides an exact method
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for a static SRCC problem in a competitive scenario.
3.3 Proposed mathematical model
We begin by brieﬂy recapitulating the problem deﬁnition which is given in exten-
sive detail in Section 2.7 of Chapter 2. Our objective is to maximize the revenue
earned by one of the competing airlines and ﬁnding the booking limits that achieve
this maximization. The booking limits of the other airline and hence the revenue
earned by it is also determined by the model. As mentioned earlier, we consider a
duopoly i.e. there are two and only two competing airlines, each having two fare-
classes. The prices of the comparable fare-classes for the two airlines may be same or
diﬀerent from each other and customers may change their preference depending on
the prices oﬀered. This phenomenon is termed as customer overﬂow in airline RM
parlance. Published literature that deals with customer overﬂow in a competitive
scenario viz. Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31] and Gao et al., 2010 [16] considers
that the expected demand of an airline for a particular fare-class is a combination of
their loyal customers and customers who have overﬂown from their competitor after
being refused a ticket in the latter due to unavailability of seats. In essence, extant
literature does not consider customer choice as one of the variables that might aﬀect
their model. Rather, whether a customer buys a seat on its ﬁrst choice airline or
not becomes the sole discretion of the availability of seats in the preferred airline and
hence, that of the airline itself. Contrary to that, we model a price-based overﬂow
rather than a capacity constraint-based overﬂow. We consider a scenario where the
customer has a choice of whether or not he would purchase a ticket from his preferred
airline or from its competitor. In this case, we assume that this choice is based on
the price at which the tickets are oﬀered. In this thesis, the overﬂow equation is
modeled according to Feichtinger and Dockner, 1985 [15] who considered the overﬂow
as a function of market share of competitors and the behaviour of customers when
there is a diﬀerence in price between competitors for similar products. For the initial
model development, we consider that the overﬂow occurs from airline j to airline i
only. The notations considered here are explained in preface section Notations on
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page viii. Given the above scenario, the optimization model is deﬁned as follows:
Objective
Maximize Ri = pi1
(
ai1 + a
Ov,j
1
)
+ pi2
(
ai2 + a
Ov,j
2
)
(3.13)
Constraints
ai2 = min
(
x,Di2
)
(3.14a)
aj2 = min
(
max
(
Dj2 −
⌊
aOv,j2
⌋
, 0
)
, C − aj1
)
(3.14b)
ai1 = min
(
C − ai2, Di1
)
(3.14c)
aj1 = max
(
Dj1 −
⌊
aOv,j1
⌋
, 0
)
(3.14d)
ai1 + a
Ov,j
1 ≤ C − x (3.14e)
ai2 + a
Ov,j
2 ≤ x (3.14f)
0 ≤ x ≤ C (3.14g)
aOv,jn ≤
⌊
aOv,jn
⌋
n = 1, 2 (3.14h)
aOv,kn = c1M
k
n + c2 ∗max
((
pkn − pkn
)
, 0
)
, c2 6= 1 n = 1, 2, k = i, j (3.14i)
Rj = pj1a
j
1 + p
j
2a
j
2 (3.14j)
where, equation (3.13) gives our objective function that maximizes the revenue earned
by airline i by setting a booking limit of Class 2 for airline i. Equation (3.14a) de-
notes that the no. of Class 2 requests accepted by airline i, which is the minimum
of the booking limit set for class 2 for airline i or the demand for that class. Equa-
tion(3.14b) denotes the number of Class 2 requests accepted by airline j. The term
max
(
Dj2 −
⌊
aOv,j2
⌋
, 0
)
accounts for the demand of Class 2 passengers encountered
by airline j after considering that a part of the customers may have overﬂown to
airline i. The MAX function ensures that this term returns a positive number or
zero. The FLOOR of the overﬂow term
(⌊
aOv,j2
⌋)
is considered, wherever it ap-
pears, to ensure that the number of overﬂow passengers is not a fraction. In case
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of no overﬂow, equation(3.14b) ensures that the maximum capacity of the airline is
not exceeded after accommodating the high-fare customers or the total demand of
that class is met, whichever is lower. Equation (3.14c) denotes that the number of
Class 1 requests accepted by airline i is the minimum of the remaining capacity after
fulﬁlling all Class 2 requests or demand for class 1 of airline i. The number of Class
1 requests accepted by airline j, equation (3.14d), is the number of customers left
behind after accounting for the overﬂow of passengers to the competing airline. The
MAX function ensures that the demand function does not return a negative value.
Equation (3.14e) indicates that the maximum no. of accepted requests for class 1 for
airline i cannot exceed the maximum capacity available for that Class and equation
(3.14f) indicates that the maximum number of accepted requests by Class 2 for airline
i cannot exceed the set booking limit. Equation (3.14g) indicates that the decision
variable, x will be a positive value less than or equal to the maximum capacity of the
airline, C. Equation (3.14h) accommodates in airline i the maximum number of over-
ﬂows allowed depending on its capacity constraint. aOv,jn gives the maximum number
of overﬂow passengers accommodated in airline i after rounding oﬀ the value to the
nearest integer. Thus, equation (3.14h) accepts only that part of the total overﬂow
passengers that can be accommodated given the set booking limit and the airline
capacity. The rest of the passengers who overﬂow from the other airline are `lost' as
mentioned in the assumptions in section 2.7 and do not return to their ﬁrst choice
airline. Equation (5.25) gives the overﬂow of passengers from one airline to the other
and borrows from the overﬂow deﬁnition of Feichtinger & Dockner[15]. According to
the authors, the overﬂow of customers from ﬁrm j(i) to ﬁrm i(j) increases more than
proportionally with increasing diﬀerence between its price and the threshold price
(pk − pk) and linearly with the current market share of ﬁrm j(i). In our model, c1
accounts for the proportionality constant associated with the eﬀect of market share,
and c2 accounts for the proportionality constant associated with the eﬀect of price. In
equation (5.25), pkn is the fare price for airline k, Class n and p
k
n is the threshold price
above which the overﬂow occurs, where k = i, j, n = 1, 2 . In cases where pkn < p
k
n,
no overﬂow occurs and in that case the MAX function, max
((
pkn − pkn
)
, 0
)
, returns
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a value of zero. However, when pkn > p
k
n, the term max
((
pkn − pkn
)
, 0
)
returns a
positive value greater than zero and equation (5.25) calculates the total number of
passengers that overﬂow. However, since this number maybe a fraction, we take the
FLOOR function in equation (3.14h) to round it oﬀ to the nearest integer and ac-
cept the adequate no. of overﬂow customers such that the aircraft capacity is not
exceeded. Equation (3.14j) calculates the revenue earned by airline j.
3.4 Numerical computations
We solved the above model using Lingo 8.0 and compared it with the standard EMSR
model, considering that airline i works in a monopolistic scenario. To the best of our
knowledge, even in a competitive scenario, it is the current practice to calculate the
booking limits based on the EMSR model (monopolistic market assumption) and
then make adjustments based on human intervention with the help of experienced
personnel. Hence, we feel that EMSR is a good base model with which to compare
the results obtained by our model. For our model, we worked out diﬀerent scenarios
holding the price of airline i constant and varying the price of airline j. The price
for airline i tickets for class 1 and 2 were 500 and 300 respectively. We also consider
that the demand for airline i follows a normal distribution with a mean of 100 &
standard deviation of 10 for Class 1, and a mean of 150 with standard deviation of
15 for Class 2. The total airline capacity, C = 150. The market shares of airlines
i and j are considered to be 50% in each fare-class and c1 = 1.0 and c2 = 1.5. We
consider that the threshold price above which an overﬂow occurs from airline j to i
is 5% higher than the price oﬀered by airline i in the respective fare-class. For the
numerical computations here, we consider that overﬂow occurs only from airline j to
airline i only. Hence, the prices mentioned in Column 1 of Table 3.1 are the prices for
airline j for that particular computation given that the prices for Classes 1 and 2 of
airline i are 500 and 300 respectively. Column 2 of Table 3.1 gives the booking limit
and revenue obtained from our model for airline i under given conditions. Columns
3 to 6 give the booking limits and revenue obtained using the EMSR method for the
same mean demand of 100 for Class 1 of airline i with a standard deviation of 10, 20,
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30 and 50 for Cases A, B, C and D respectively. The results obtained are given in Ta-
ble 3.1. The algorithm followed to arrive at the results given in Table 3.1 is as follows:
Start
Step 1: pi1 = 500, p
i
2 = 300
Step 2: pj1 = p
i
1, p
j
2 = p
i
2
Step 3: Find revenue earned using proposed mathematical model
Step 4: Find revenue earned using EMSR when µD1 = 100 &
a: σ2D1 = 10;
b: σ2D1 = 20;
c: σ2D1 = 30;
d: σ2D1 = 50
Step 5: Repeat Steps 3 and 4, when
i. pj1 = p
i
1 + 50 & p
j
2 = p
i
2 + 50
ii. pj1 = p
i
1 + 100 & p
j
2 = p
i
2 + 100
iii. pj1 = p1 & p
j
2 = p
i
2 + 50
iv. pj1 = p
i
1 & p
j
2 = p
i
2 + 100
v. pj1 = p
i
1 + 50 & p
j
2 = p2
vi. pj1 = p
i
1 + 100 & p
j
2 = p
i
2
vii. pj1 = p
i
1 + 200 & p
j
2 = p
i
2
End
3.5 Conclusions
From Table 3.1, we note that:
3.5 Conclusions 37
Table 3.1: Booking limit, x and Revenue earned by airline i, Ri(in '000s)
Case
Model EMSR
Case A Case B Case C Case D
x Ri x Ri x Ri x Ri x Ri
1 (pj1 = 500, p
j
2 = 300) 50 65.0 53 64.4 56 63.8 58 63.4 63 62.4
2 (pj1 = 550, p
j
2 = 350) 12 72.6 53 64.4 56 63.8 58 63.4 63 62.4
3 (pj1 = 600, p
j
2 = 400) 0 75.0 53 64.4 56 63.8 58 63.4 63 62.4
4 (pj1 = 500, p
j
2 = 350) 50 65.0 53 64.4 56 63.8 58 63.4 63 62.4
5 (pj1 = 500, p
j
2 = 400) 50 65.0 53 64.4 56 63.8 58 63.4 63 62.4
6 (pj1 = 550, p
j
2 = 300) 12 72.6 53 64.4 56 63.8 58 63.4 63 62.4
7 (pj1 = 600, p
j
2 = 300) 0 75.0 53 64.4 56 63.8 58 63.4 63 62.4
8 (pj1 = 700, p
j
2 = 300) 0 75.0 53 64.4 56 63.8 58 63.4 63 62.4
• Revenue earned by airline i in a competitive scenario where overﬂow of cus-
tomers from the competing airline is considered, is consistently more than what
is calculated by EMSR in a monopolistic scenario.
• The booking limit i.e. the no. of seats reserved for the lower fare-class is less
in a competitive scenario than in a monopoly. This is in conjunction with the
conclusions by Netessine & Shumsky, 2005 [31], Li et al., 2007 [22] and Gao et
al., 2010 [16].
• As the price diﬀerential between airline i and j increases, more overﬂow pas-
sengers from Class 1 of airline j are accommodated in airline i and hence the
booking limit for Class 2 passengers in airline i decreases.
• The Class 2 booking limits obtained from EMSR increases as the standard
deviation of the Class 1 demand of airline i increases. This occurs due to the
decreased certainty of Class 1 demands with increase standard deviation.
Thus, it may be concluded that:
• Competition favors the high fare customers.
• Allowing a price-based migration of customers between competitors, helps to
increase the revenue earned by the lower priced airline.
Chapter 4
Development of Game theoretic
model and numerical computations to
show the existence of Nash
equilibrium
4.1 Introduction
Here, we develop the Game theoretic model and show through numerical computa-
tions the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this problem. In his paper
on a selective exposition of non-cooperative game theory (GT) and its application
to advertising, product and price competition, Moorthy [30] gives an example of two
competing airlines serving the same market, each having a single fare-class which can
be priced diﬀerently by the competitors. The author shows that in such a scenario,
Nash equilibrium is achieved when both the airlines price at the same lower price
rather than at the same higher price or at diﬀerent prices. In this thesis, we use non-
cooperative GT to determine the price(s) at which the airlines achieve pure strategy
Nash equilibrium(s), the booking limits at these points and the factors that determine
this equilibrium when there are multiple fare-classes that are priced diﬀerently. We
begin this section with a short introduction on Nash equilibrium (NE) and the best
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response method used to determine NE point(s). We then go on to lay out the GT
model and give details on the computational experiments performed to determine the
seat allocation and revenues earned by the airlines at diﬀerent fare prices in diﬀerent
classes. We also determine the strategy or strategies at which NE is achieved in our
problem context and conclude with the major takeaways from this Chapter.
4.2 Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium (NE) is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving
two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strate-
gies of the other players. A strategy is a complete set of actions that a player may
use to play the game. It must be one of the player's allowed sets of actions. A set
of strategies is a NE if no player can do better by unilaterally changing his or her
strategy.
Given a game Γ = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉 with pure strategies, the strategy proﬁle s∗ =
(s∗1, s
∗
2, ..., s
∗
n) is said to be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ if,
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i),∀si ∈ Si,∀i = 1, 2, ..., n.
A game is deﬁned through the triplet notation of 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉, where N gives
the number of players, Si is the set of strategies available to all players and ui are
the payoﬀs / utility obtained from adopting strategy si ∈ Si. Nash equilibrium is
achieved when the utility obtained when player i and all players other than i (−i)
play the equilibrium strategy, s∗ is greater than or equal to the utility obtained when
player i does not play the equilibrium strategy, s∗ but all players, other than i, play
the equilibrium strategy.
When the inequality above holds strictly (with > instead of ≥) for all players and
all feasible alternative strategies, then the equilibrium is classiﬁed as a strict Nash
equilibrium. Otherwise it is known as a weak Nash equilibrium.
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A strategy is said to be dominant if, regardless of what any other player does, the
strategy earns a player a larger payoﬀ than any other. If one strategy is dominant,
then all others are dominated.
A strategy s∗i ∈ Si is said to be strictly dominant strategy for player i, if it strictly
dominates every other strategy si ∈ Si. That is, ∀si 6= s∗i ,
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) > ui(si, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ S−i
A strategy s∗i is said to be weakly dominant strategy for player i if it weakly dom-
inates every other strategy si ∈ Si and the above inequality is ≥ instead of >.
Pareto optimality is a measure of eﬃciency. An outcome of a game is Pareto
optimal if there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well oﬀ and
at least one player strictly better oﬀ. That is, a Pareto Optimal outcome cannot be
improved upon without hurting at least one player. Often, the NE may seem non-
rational from a third-person perspective. This is because it may happen that a NE is
not Pareto Optimal, implying that the players' payoﬀs can all be increased. However,
a strong NE has to be Pareto optimal.
4.2.1 Finding NE by best response method
In this thesis, we use the best response method to ﬁnd the NE point(s). In GT, best
response is the strategy (or strategies) which produces the most favorable outcome
for a player, taking other players' strategies as given. We use the classical problem
of Prisoner's Dilemma to illustrate the best response method for ﬁnding NE.
The problem of Prisoner's Dilemma:
• N = 2, P1 and P2 are two prisoners who have been arrested for a crime and
interrogated separately.
• Si = [s1, s2] are the strategies adopted by the prisoners where s1 = keep quiet
and s2 = confess.
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• The payoﬀs, ui = [u1, u2, u3, u4] are :
 u1 = [−1,−1] i.e. when both prisoners follow s1, each get 1 month in jail.
 u2 = [−12, 0] i.e. when prisoner 1 adopts s1 and prisoner 2 adopts s2,
prisoner 1 gets 12 months in jail & prisoner 2 goes free.
 u3 = [0,−12] i.e. when prisoner 1 adopts s2 and prisoner 2 adopts s1,
prisoner 2 gets 12 months in jail & prisoner 1 goes free.
 u4 = [−8,−8] i.e. when both prisoners adopt s2, each get 8 months in jail.
The same has been mentioned in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Payoﬀs from Prisoner's Dilemma
P1
s1 = Keep quiet s2 = Confess
P2
s1 = Keep quiet -1,-1 0*,-12
s2 = Confess -12,0** -8*,-8**
Best response method for ﬁnding N.E.
Step 1: For i =1,2
From the payoﬀ table (Table 4.1), ﬁnd P1's best response when P2 adopts
strategy, si & mark with an asterisk (*).
Step 2: For i=1,2
From the payoﬀ table, ﬁnd out P2's best response when P1 adopts strategy,
si & mark with a double asterisk (**).
Step 3: NE exists where P1's best response coincides with that of P2.
4.3 Game theoretic model
The non-cooperative game that we study in this thesis is deﬁned as follows:
• Number of players, N = 2, viz. airlines i and j, each of whom operate two
fare-classes.
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• Strategies,Si adopted are:
s1: Both classes are priced at the base price.
s2: Class 1 is priced at a predetermined percentage higher than the base price,
Class 2 is priced at the base price .
s3: Class 1 is priced at the base price, Class 2 is priced at a predetermined
percentage higher than the base price.
s4: Both classes are priced at a predetermined percentage higher than the base
price.
• The utilities, ui = [u1, u2, u3, . . . , u16] are the revenues earned by the competitors
when they adopt diﬀerent pricing strategies as shown in Tables 4.3, 4.5, 4.10
and 4.12.
The other features of the problem are:
• the two airlines operate between the same origin and destination points in a
speciﬁc time interval;
• the airlines know the times of their own ﬂights and that of their competitor;
• the capacity of their planes and that of their competitor is known and is the
same;
• the no. of fare classes in their planes and that of the competitor at the time of
booking is known;
• the exact fare of each of those fare-classes for their own as well as that of the
competitor at the time of booking is known;
• the market share enjoyed by themselves and their competitor is known;
• the average demand for high and low fare-class tickets for themselves and for
their competitor is known;
• the airlines know the no. of seats that they have reserved for the lower fare-class
in their planes;
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• the no. of seats that the competitor has reserved for the lower fare-class is not
known.
The assumptions here are the same as those mentioned in section 2.7.
The pricing strategies adopted by the competing airlines are:
4.4 Finding Nash Equilibrium
For a given pricing strategy we ﬁnd the optimal booking limit using the non-linear
model developed in section 3.3 to determine the revenue (utility) earned by airline
i and consequently calculate the revenue earned by airline j at the diﬀerent prices
and the associated seat allocations. Then, we determine the point at which a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium is achieved when each of the two competing airlines can
adapt any one of the above enumerated pricing strategies.
4.4.1 Numerical computations
4.4.1.1 When demand for Class 2 is greater than Class 1 (D2k > D
1
k)
For the computational experiments, we consider the base price for both the airlines to
be 500 and 300 for Class 1 and 2 respectively, and vary the price of the other airline
as a percentage of the base price, as mentioned in Table 4.2. We consider the total
airline capacity, C for the airlines to be 150 each and that they share the market
equally in the two fare-classes. The demands are considered as Di1 = D
j
1 = 100 and
Di2 = D
j
2 = 150, when D
k
2/D
k
1 = 1.5 and D
i
1 = D
j
1 = 100 and D
i
2 = D
j
2 = 125, when
Dk2/D
k
1 = 1.25. The constants, c1 and c2 mentioned in equation 5.25 have been taken
as 1.0 and 1.5 respectively, since the overﬂow equation mentions that the overﬂow of
customers increases linearly with the current market share of ﬁrm j(i) and more than
proportionally with increasing diﬀerence pk− pk. The experimental design is given in
Table 4.2.
According to our experimental design shown in Table 4.2, there are 60 conﬁgura-
tions for which we carry out the numerical computations. In this thesis, we show just
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Table 4.2: Experimental design when D2k > D
1
k
Factor Levels No. of levels
Price(% of Base price) 5,6,7,8,9,10,20,30,40,50 10
Threshold(% above pkn) 3, 5, 8 3
Demand ratio(Dk2/D
k
1) 1.25, 1.5 2
Total conﬁgurations 10 x 3 x2 = 60
Instances/conﬁguration 16
Total instances 60 x 16 = 960
two of those tables. Table 4.3 gives the revenue obtained when the demand ratio for
Class 2 to Class 1 fares is 1.5, the overﬂow threshold is set at 3% and prices are varied
at 5% over the base price. Table 4.5 gives the revenues obtained when the demand
ratio for Class 2 to Class 1 fares is 1.5, the overﬂow threshold is set at 8% and prices
are varied at 40% over the base price.. These tables also show the NE point(s) in
each of the cases. Tables 4.4 and 4.6 show the seat allocations in the aforementioned
cases respectively. Both Tables 4.3 and 4.5 give the utility obtained by aurlines i and
j when i follows a particular strategy and j follows the same or a diﬀerent strategy.
The ﬁrst term corresponds to the revenue earned by airline i and the second term
to that earned by airline j. The diagonal elements of the tables that corresponds to
Cases 1, 6, 11 and 16 are those where both airlines follow the same pricing strategy
i.e. s1, s2, s3 and s4 respectively. Cases 5, 9 and 13 corresponds to the case where
airline i follows strategy, s1 and airline j follows s2, s3 and s4 respectively. Cases
2, 10 and 14 corresponds to where airline i follows s2 and j follows s1, s3 and s4
respectively. Similarly, Cases 3, 7 and 15 corresponds to where airline i follows s3
and j follows s1, s2 and s4 respectively. Finally, Cases 4, 8 and 12 correspond to
where airline i follows s4 and j follows s1, s2 and s3 respectively. The best responses
are marked with asterisks and double asterisks and the NE is arrived at where the
best response of airline i coincides with that of airline j. The NE points for all the
60 conﬁgurations are summarized in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.
From the results of the numerical computation, we can conclude that:
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Table 4.3: Revenue generated in Rs.'000 when Base price+5%, threshold=3%,
Dk2/D
k
1=1.5
Airline i
500,300 525,300 500,315 525,315
Airlinej
500,300 u1 = 65, 65 u2 = 64.13, 68 u3 = 65.75
∗, 65 u4 = 65.1, 68
525,300 u5 = 68, 64.13 u6 = 67.5, 67.5 u7 = 68.53
∗, 64.13 u8 = 68.25, 67.5
500,315 u9 = 65, 65.75
∗∗ u10 = 64.13, 68.53∗∗ u11 = 65.75∗, 65.75∗∗ u12 = 65.1, 68.53∗∗
525,315 u13 = 68, 65.1 u14 = 67.5, 68.25 u15 = 68.53
∗, 65.1 u16 = 68.25, 68.25
Table 4.4: Seat allocation corresponding to Table 4.3
Cases 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14, 16 5, 7, 13, 15 2, 4, 10, 12
ai1, a
i
2 100, 50 115, 35 85, 65
aj1, a
j
2 100, 50 85, 65 115, 35
• A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is only reached when both airlines are priced
identically. The best response method for ﬁnding NE, as mentioned in Section
4.2.1, considers that a NE is reached when the best response of one player
coincides with that of the other. It may be noted from Table 4.3 that in Case
11, the best responses of airlines i and j coincide and hence that is the NE
point. Similarly, from Table 4.5, it can be seen that NE exists in Cases 1, 6, 11
and 16, where the best responses of both airlines coincide. Also Table 4.7 and
4.8 show that a NE is only reached in any or all of Cases 1, 6, 11 and 16 only.
As mentioned earlier, in these cases both the airlines follow the same pricing
strategy and are identically priced and hence our conclusion.
• When the two airlines are priced identically, there is no overﬂow and hence the
revenues earned by them are identical as seen in Cases 1, 6, 11 and 16 of Tables
4.3 and 4.5.
• It may seem from Table 4.3 that when both airlines i and j follow strategy 2
(case 6) & strategy 4 (case 16), they earn higher revenues than the NE point
of where both airlines follow strategy 3 (case 11). However, it should be noted
that strategies 2 & 4 are strictly dominated by strategy 3 for both airlines i and
j. This also re-establishes the fact that a Nash equilibrium point need not be
Pareto optimal, as explained in Section 4.2.
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Table 4.5: Revenue generated in Rs.'000 when Base price+40%, threshold=8%,
Dk2/D
k
1=1.5
Airline i
500,300 700,300 500,420 700,420
Airlinej
500,300 u1 = 65
∗, 65∗∗ u2 = 45, 75 u3 = 52.52, 65 u4 = 2.52, 75
700,300 u5 = 75, 45 u6 = 85
∗, 85∗∗ u7 = 75, 45 u8 = 72.52, 85
500,420 u9 = 65, 52.52 u10 = 45, 75 u11 = 71
∗, 71∗∗ u12 = 63, 75
700,420 u13 = 75, 2.52 u14 = 85, 72.52 u15 = 75, 63 u16 = 91
∗, 91∗∗
Table 4.6: Seat allocation corresponding to Table 4.5
Cases 1, 6, 11, 16 2, 10, 12 3, 8 4 5, 7, 15 9, 14 13
ai1, a
i
2 100,50 0,150 100,6 0,6 150,0 100,50 150,0
aj1, a
j
2 100,50 150,0 100,50 150,0 0,150 100,6 0,6
• In our computations it is noticed that inclusion of more equilibrium points at
higher price variations occurs because of higher overﬂows, thus reducing the no.
of dominated strategies. Thus, more strategies become NE points, as can be
seen in Table 4.5.
• At higher overﬂow thresholds, equilibrium point shifts from 11 to 16 as strategy
4 becomes the dominant strategy as seen in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.
• Not much change in the equilibrium patterns is seen at the diﬀerent demand
ratios.
4.4.1.2 When demand for Class 2 is lesser than Class 1 (D2k < D
1
k)
In this section, all the parameters of the numerical computations are the same as in
Section 4.4.1.1, except for the demand ratio between the two classes. Whereas, earlier
we had considered that D2k > D
1
k, here we consider that D
2
k < D
1
k and try to see if our
earlier results hold in this scenario too. We also experiment with really low threshold
values and examine the diﬀerence in any of the NE points in that case.
As in Section 4.4.1.1, here too we consider the base price for both the airlines to
be 500 and 300 for Class 1 and 2 respectively, and vary the price of the other airline
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Table 4.7: Equlibrium points at diﬀerent prices and thresholds when Dk2/D
k
1 = 1.5
Equilibrium points
Price variations 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Threshold,t
3% 11 11 11 11 11 11 11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16
5% 16 16 16 11 11 11 11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16
8% 16 16 16 16 16 16 11,16 11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16
Table 4.8: Equlibrium points at diﬀerent prices and thresholds when Dk2/D
k
1 = 1.25
Equilibrium points
Price variations 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Threshold,t
3% 11 11 11 11 11 11 11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16
5% 16 16 16 11 11 11 11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16
8% 16 16 16 16 16 16 11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16
as a percentage of the base price, as mentioned in Table 4.9. We consider the total
airline capacity, C for the airlines to be 150 each and that they share the market
equally in the two fare-classes. The demands are considered as Di1 = D
j
1 = 100 and
Di2 = D
j
2 = 75, i.e. D
k
2/D
k
1 = 0.75. The constants, c1 and c2 mentioned in equa-
tion 5.25 have been taken as 1.0 and 1.5 respectively, since the overﬂow equation
mentions that the overﬂow of customers increases linearly with the current market
share of ﬁrm j(i) and more than proportionally with increasing diﬀerence pk − pk.
The experimental design is given in Table 4.9. As can be seen from Table 4.9, we
have considered very low thresholds for the overﬂow in this case. This is because
we wanted to determine the robustness of our model for extreme cases and also see
whether N.E. points exist under these circumstances.
Table 4.9: Experimental design when D2k < D
1
k
Factor Levels No. of levels
Price(% of Base price) 5,6,7,8,9,10,20,30,40,50 10
Threshold(% above pkn) 1, 0.5 2
Demand ratio(Dk2/D
k
1) 0.75 1
Total conﬁgurations 10 x 2 x 1 = 20
Instances/conﬁguration 16
Total instances 20 x 16 = 320
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The results of the numerical computations showed us that the model behaved sim-
ilar to the earlier computations where D2k > D
1
k and there exists a pure strategy N.E.
in this case too. Portrayed here are the typical results obtained with diﬀerent thresh-
old values at diﬀerent price variations (Tables 4.10 and 4.12) and the seat allocations
in the corresponding cases (Tables 4.11 and 4.13). The results are summarized in
Table 4.14.
Table 4.10: Revenue generated in Rs.'000 when Base price+20%, threshold=0.5%,
Dk2/D
k
1=0.75
Airline i
500,300 550,300 500,330 550,330
Airlinej
500,300 u1 = 65
∗, 65∗∗ u2 = 38.45, 75 u3 = 60.56, 65 u4 = 26.51, 75
550,300 u5 = 75, 22.5 u6 = 75
∗, 75∗∗ u7 = 75, 22.5 u8 = 60, 75
500,330 u9 = 65, 50 u10 = 22.5, 75 u11 = 68
∗, 68∗∗ u12 = 27, 75
700,420 u13 = 75, 0 u14 = 75, 60 u15 = 75, 27 u16 = 78
∗, 78∗∗
Table 4.11: Seat allocation corresponding to Table 4.10
Cases 1, 6, 11, 16 2, 10, 12 5, 7, 15 9, 14 3, 8 4 13
ai1, a
i
2 100,50 0,75 150, 0 100, 50 100, 0 0, 0 150, 0
aj1, a
j
2 100,50 150,0 0, 75 100, 0 100, 50 150, 0 0, 0
Table 4.12: Revenue generated in Rs.'000 when Base price+5%, threshold=1%,
Dk2/D
k
1=0.75
Airline i
500,300 525,300 500,315 525,315
Airlinej
500,300 u1 = 65, 65 u2 = 59.25, 71 u3 = 65.75
∗, 65 u4 = 54.71, 71
525,300 u5 = 71, 59.25 u6 = 67.5, 67.5 u7 = 71.3
∗, 59.25 u8 = 68.25, 67.5
500,315 u9 = 65, 65.75
∗∗ u10 = 59.25, 71.3∗∗ u11 = 65.75∗, 65.75∗∗ u12 = 60.38, 71.3∗∗
525,315 u13 = 71, 54.71 u14 = 67.5, 68.25 u15 = 71.3
∗, 60.38 u16 = 68.25, 68.25
The results from these computations provide us with similar conclusions to the
results from Section 4.4.1.1 and these are:
• Pure strategy N.E. exists and it is arrived at only when both the airlines are
priced identically i.e. when both follow the same pricing strategy.
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Table 4.13: Seat allocation corresponding to Table 4.12
Cases 1,3,6,8,9,11,13,16 2,10,12 5,7,15 4 13
ai1, a
i
2 100,50 70,75 100,20 70,57 100,20
aj1, a
j
2 100,50 100,20 70,75 100,20 70,57
Table 4.14: Equlibrium points at diﬀerent prices and thresholds when Dk2/D
k
1 = 0.75
Equilibrium points
Price variations 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Threshold,t
0.5% 11 11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16
1% 11 11 11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16 1,6,11,16
• When the two airlines are priced identically, there is no overﬂow and hence the
revenues earned by them are identical as seen in Cases 1, 6, 11 and 16 of Tables
4.10 and 4.12.
• Table 4.12 shows that strategies 2 and 4 are Pareto optimal, thus reiterating
the fact that Nash equilibrium point need not be Pareto optimal.
• Table 4.14 shows that the dominance of Strategy 3 (Case 11) is lost at lower
price variation when the threshold price for overﬂow is lowered.
4.5 Conclusion
In this part of the thesis, we provide the basic deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium and
Game theory and describe the best response method for ﬁnding NE points for a
Game theoretic model along with examples for the same. We then deﬁne our GT
model and show, through numerical computations, the existence of pure strategy NE
points that maximize revenues earned by the competitors.
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The most important managerial implication here is that NE is reached only when
the prices are identical implying that the airlines do not stand to gain by undercutting
the competition. However, competitively, lower price than the competition can be
used as a means to gain market share in the long run.
Chapter 5
Theoretical proof of existence of Nash
equilibrium
5.1 Introduction
In the ﬁrst two parts of this thesis, we deﬁne the problem for optimizing seat allocation
for two competing airlines, each of which operate two fare-classes and ﬂy between the
same origin and destination points in the same time period. We also consider a price-
sensitive overﬂow of passengers from the higher priced airline to the lower priced one,
provided that the price diﬀerence is greater than a predeﬁned threshold price. The
salient features of our problem and the assumptions therein are detailed in Section 2.7.
In Chapter 3, we develop an optimization model to allocate the seat inventory and
calculate the revenues earned by the two airlines in diﬀerent pricing scenarios. For a
particular airline capacity and demand, we numerically compare the results obtained
from our model with that obtained from EMSR calculations. The numerical evalua-
tions showed us that our model performs consistently better than EMSR.
Given the realization in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 we develop a four strategy Game
theoretic model based on diﬀerent price combinations. Here, we show numerically
that Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists in the given scenario when both the competitors
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are priced identically.
However, only numerical analysis does not suﬃce to provide proof of the existence
of a NE for our problem under all possible price, capacity and demand scenarios.
Hence, in this Chapter we develop equations for seat allocations and revenues earned
and prove theoretically the existence of NE and determine the pricing strategies to
be followed to achieve it.
As mentioned above, in Chapter 3, we develop an optimization model to deter-
mine the seat allocation and revenue earned. In this chapter, we use the EMSR
model to determine the seat allocation and revenue earned. The price based overﬂow
of customers is incorporated in the demand equation to calculate the revenue earned
when there is a price diﬀerential between the competitors. Contrary to Chapter 4 of
this thesis where we consider a four strategy Game theoretic model, here we consider
a two and three strategy Game theoretic model and extrapolate our results to the
more-than-two case.
In the subsequent sections, we elaborate the mechanism used to theoretically
determine the seat allocations and revenue earned by the two airlines in the two-
strategy and three-strategy pricing policy games, prove the existence of NE and the
strategies at which it exists and provide our conclusions.
5.2 Seat allocation and revenue earned in a two-
strategy pricing policy game
To begin with, we recapitulate the problem deﬁnition. Following are the features of
our problem:
• We consider a duopoly i.e. two competing airlines only.
• Each airline consists of two fare-classes only.
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• We model a static realization of the simultaneous seat allocation and pricing
problem.
• Price diﬀerentiation in the same fare-class between the competing airlines is
considered, i.e. pin 6= pjn, where n = 1, 2 represent the high-fare and low-
fare classes respectively of a particular airline and i, j represent the competing
airlines.
• Overﬂow of passengers is considered. When the price of tickets in their 1st
choice airline is higher than a pre-deﬁned threshold price, then the customers
overﬂow to the other airline in their preferred booking class i.e. the customers
are driven away by increasing prices.
• Buy-up or buy-down is not considered.
• Cancellations are not considered.
The assumptions are as follows:
• There are no other ﬂights operating within this time-frame for the same route
and both ﬂights have the same capacity.
• If all passengers who overﬂow cannot be accommodated by the competitor, then
the passengers do not return to the higher priced airline but are lost.
• A ticket purchased at either fare gives access to the same product viz. a coach-
class seat on one ﬂight leg.
• The service restrictions placed on the low-fare tickets is the same for both the
airlines.
• The two ﬂights oﬀer the same fare structure and appeal to the same market.
• Demand for both the airlines in a particular fare-class is the same.
• The market is equally shared by the competitors.
The pricing policies followed in a two-strategy scenario are as follows:
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s1: Both classes are priced at the base price.
s2: Class 1 is priced at a predetermined percentage higher than the base price, Class
2 is priced at the base price
The price variables and parameters adopted to calculate the seat allocations and
revenues earned in a two-strategy Game are given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Strategies employed & revenues earned - two strategy case
Airline i
p, βp αp, βp
Airlinej
p, βp
Case a Case d
Rai , R
a
j R
d
i , R
d
j
αp, βp
Case b Case c
Rbi , R
b
j R
c
i , R
c
j
As mentioned earlier, we follow the popular EMSR method to calculate the seat
allocation theoretically. In 1972, Littlewood [25] proposed that discount fare book-
ings should be accepted as long as their revenue value exceeded the expected revenue
of future full-fare bookings. This came to be known as Littewood's rule. Belobaba,
1987b [3] extended Littlewood's rule to apply to more than two fare-class problem and
called it EMSR. For more than two fare-classes, EMSR essentially applies Littlewood's
rule sequentially in increasing fare order. Though it provides conservative estimates
of protection limits, it is found to be optimal for a two fare-class problem.
Considering the seat protection of Class 1 customers using the Expected Marginal
Seat Revenue (EMSR) method, we have
F2 = F1P [X > x1] (5.1)
where x1 is the protection level for Class 1 tickets. Hence,
x1 = F
−1(x1) (5.2)
The no. of customers actually accommodated in Class 1 of airline i, ai1 is,
5.2 Seat allocation and revenue earned in a two-strategy pricing policy game 55
ai1 = min(x1, C) (5.3a)
= min
(
F−1(x1), C
)
(5.3b)
The no. of customers actually accommodated in Class 2 of airline i, ai2 is,
ai2 = min(D2, C − ai1) (5.4a)
= min
(
D2, C −min
(
F−1(x1), C
))
(5.4b)
The no. of customers actually accommodated in Class 1 of airline j, aj1 is,
aj1 = min(D1, C) (5.5)
The no. of customers actually accommodated in Class 2 of airline j, aj2 is,
aj2 = min(D2, C − aj1) (5.6a)
= min
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
(5.6b)
We can calculate the revenue earned by airline k, k = i, j Rk as,
Rk = p
k
1 ∗ ak1 + pk2 ∗ ak2 (5.7)
Thus from equations 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 we get,
Ri = p
i
1 ∗min
(
F−1(x1), C
)
+ pi2 ∗min
(
D2, C −min
(
F−1(x1), C
))
(5.8)
and,
Rj = p
j
1 ∗min(D1, C) + pj2 ∗min
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
(5.9)
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The general practice is to assume that demand follows a Normal distribution.
However, since we desire a closed form solution for our problem, we assume that
demand follows an Uniform distribution. Assumptions with respect to the demand
distribution are as follows:
• Dkn v U(a, b), where n = 1, 2, k = i, j, and a and b are the lowest & highest
demands respectively for a particular fare-class of an airline.
• The lowest demand of the two airlines in the respective fare-classes are equal to
each other. So, Di1 = D
j
1 = D1 and D
i
2 = D
j
2 = D2.
Considering that demand follows an Uniform distribution, we have,
F (x1) =
x1 − a
b− a = y, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 (5.10)
Hence,
F−1(x1) = x1 = a+ y(b− a) (5.11)
When we do not consider any overﬂow of passengers from one airline to another,
a = D1 and b = D1 and Hence, x1 = D1.
Thus replacing F−1(x1) = x1 = D1 in equation 5.8 we get,
Ri = p
i
1 ∗min(D1, C) + pi2 ∗min
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
= Rj (5.12)
5.2.1 Revenues earned in Cases (a) and (c)
From Table 5.1, it may be noted that in Cases (a) and (c) there will be no overﬂow of
passengers, in either Class 1 or Class 2, between the airlines since they are identically
priced. Hence the revenues earned by the two airlines in these cases will be equal, i.e.
Rai = R
a
j and R
c
i = R
c
j. Hence using equation 5.12 and the price parameters given
in Table 5.1 for Cases (a) and (c), we can write the equations for Rai /R
a
j and R
c
i/R
c
j as
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Rai = pmin(D1, C) + βpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
= Raj (5.13)
Rci = αpmin(D1, C) + βpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
= Rcj (5.14)
5.2.2 Revenues earned in Cases (b) and (d)
In Case (b), the price of Class 1 for airline i is p whereas that for airline j is αp,
hence there will be an overﬂow in Class 1 from airline j to airline i. Thus, in Case
(b), Rbi 6= Rbj. Similarly, in Case (d), there will be an overﬂow in Class 1 from airline
i to airline j and hence Rdi 6= Rdj . However, because of the exactly reverse nature of
Cases (b) and (d), we can say that Rbi = R
d
j and R
b
j = R
d
i .
Thus, considering overﬂow of customers occur from airline j to airline i in Case
(b), we get
a = D1 (5.15)
b = D1 + a
Ov,j
1 (5.16)
Hence, incorporating equations 5.15 and 5.16 into equation 5.11 we get,
x1 = D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 , with overflow (5.17a)
= D1, without overflow (5.17b)
Hence,
ai1 = min(D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 , C) with overflow (5.18a)
= min(D1, C) without overflow (5.18b)
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ai2 = min
(
D2, C −min(D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 , C)
)
with overflow (5.19a)
= min
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
without overflow (5.19b)
Similarly, the demand for airline j and hence the number of passengers accommo-
dated in each fare-class is altered in Case (b) to incorporate the overﬂow from airline
j to airline i, and
aj1 = min
(
max(D1 − aOv,j1 , 0), C
)
with overflow (5.20a)
= min(D1, C) without overflow (5.20b)
aj2 = min
(
D2, C −min
(
max(D1 − aOv,j1 , 0), C
))
with overflow (5.21a)
= min
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
without overflow (5.21b)
Hence equation 5.12 can be re-written as,
Ri = p
i
1 ∗min(D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 , C) + pi2 ∗min
(
D2, C −min(D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 , C)
)
, with overflow
(5.22a)
= pi1 ∗min(D1, C) + pi2 ∗min
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
, without overflow (5.22b)
Rj = p
j
1 ∗min
(
max(D1 − aOv,j1 , 0), C
)
+ pj2 ∗min
(
D2, C −min
(
max(D1 − aOv,j1 , 0), C
))
with o/flow
(5.23a)
= pj1 ∗min(D1, C) + pj2 ∗min
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
without overflow (5.23b)
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Contrary to Netessine and Shumsky, 2005 [31] and Gao et al., 2010 [16], who
consider that overﬂow of passengers occur due to capacity restrictions, we consider
overﬂow due to diﬀerential pricing between the competitors and hence model it ac-
cordingly. Our overﬂow function is adapted from that proposed by Feichtinger and
Dockner (1985) [15] where the overﬂow is a function of market share of competitors
and the behavior of customers when there is a diﬀerence in price between competitors
for similar products. According to the authors, the overﬂow of customers from ﬁrm
j(i) to ﬁrm i(j) increases more than proportionally with increasing diﬀerence between
its price and the threshold price, (α−αt)p, and linearly with the current market share
of ﬁrm j(i). We write the overﬂow equation as
aOv,kn =
⌊
c1M
k
n + c2 ∗max
(
(α− αt) p, 0
)⌋
, c1 = 1; c2 > 1;n = 1, 2; k = i, j (5.24)
We take the FLOOR function in equation (5.24) to round it oﬀ to the nearest
integer and not allow for fractions. Thus, the overﬂow from airline j(i) to airline i(j)
in a particular fare-class will be positive if α > αt and will be zero if α ≤ αt. Assuming
that the market share of the two airlines in the respective fare-classes are equal to
each other. So, M i1 =M
j
1 =M1 and M
i
2 =M
j
2 =M2, we can write equation 5.24 as,
aOv,kn =
⌊
c1Mn + c2 ∗max
(
(α− αt) p, 0
)⌋
, c1 = 1; c2 > 1;n = 1, 2; k = i, j (5.25)
Hence,
aOv,j1 = bc1M1 + c2 ∗ (α− αt)pc , c1 = 1; c2 > 1; (5.26)
From Table 5.1 we see that in Case b, pi1 = p, p
i
2 = βp, p
j
1 = αp and p
j
2 = βp. As
mentioned above, due to the exactly reverse nature of Cases (b) and (d), we can say
that Rbi = R
d
j and R
b
j = R
d
i . Hence,
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Rbi = pmin(D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 , C) + βpmin
(
D2, C −min
(
D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 , C
))
; α > αt
(5.27a)
= pmin(D1, C) + βpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
; α ≤ αt (5.27b)
= Rdj (5.27c)
Rbj = αpmin
(
max(D1 − aOv,j1 , 0), C
)
+ βpmin
(
D2, C −min
(
max(D1 − aOv,j1 , 0), C
))
; α > αt
(5.28a)
= αpmin
(
D1, C
)
+ βpmin
(
D2, C −min
(
D1, C
))
; α ≤ αt (5.28b)
= Rdi (5.28c)
where, aOv,j1 is as given in equation (5.26).
5.3 Finding NE - the two-strategy case
The best response method as explained in section 4.2.1 is used to ﬁnd the NE points.
To ﬁnd the best response theoretically in our two-strategy case, we compare the rev-
enues earned by airline i from each row of Table 5.1 and determine the best response
of airline i. To ﬁnd the best response for airline j, we compare the revenues earned
by j from each column of Table 5.1. Hence, for the two-strategy case we need to ﬁnd
the relationships between Rai and R
d
i to ﬁnd the best response of i when j follows
Strategy 1; and the relationship between Rbi and R
c
i to ﬁnd the best response of i
when j follows Strategy 2. Similarly to ﬁnd j's best response when i follows Strategy
1 and 2, we need to compare Raj with R
b
j and R
d
j with R
c
j respectively. Since, R
a
i = R
a
j ,
Rdi = R
b
j, R
b
i = R
d
j and R
c
i = R
c
j, we need to ﬁnd only two relationships as mentioned
in Cases A and B below. Nash equilibrium is achieved at that strategy where both
Ri and Rj yield best responses i.e. if R
a
i ≥ Rdi and Raj ≥ Rbj, then we can say that NE
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is achieved when both i and j follow Strategy 1. If however, Rdi ≥ Rai and Rdj ≥ Rcj,
then NE is achieved when j follows Strategy 1 and i follows Strategy 2 and so on.
A: Relationship between Rai (R
a
j ) and R
d
i (R
b
j) (refer Table 5.2)
B: Relationship between Rbi(R
d
j ) and R
c
i (R
c
j) (refer Table 5.3)
The relationships between the revenues earned by airlines i and j under diﬀerent
conditions for the two strategies are tabulated in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Case B is also
diagrammatically depicted in Figure 5.1
With the above understanding and to aid the readers understanding of the rela-
tionship tables (Tables 5.2 - 5.11), we will now show, for an example case, how these
relationships are arrived at and how we need to read these tables.
Let us consider Case B [Table 5.3] where we determine the relationship between
Rbi(R
d
j ) and R
c
i (R
c
j). To begin with, we state, once again, equations 5.27 and 5.14
which are:
Rbi = pmin(D1+y∗aOv,j1 , C)+βpmin
(
D2, C−min
(
D1+y∗aOv,j1 , C
))
, when α > αt;
Rbi = pmin(D1, C) + βpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
, when α ≤ αt
and, Rci = αpmin(D1, C) + βpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
Case B:
(i) When α ≤ αt,
Rci = αpmin(D1, C) + βpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
Rbi = pmin(D1, C) + βpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
Thus, Rci = R
b
i + (α− 1)pmin(D1, C)
Since, α > 1⇒ α− 1 > 0
Hence Case B(i) states that, Rci > R
b
i , when α ≤ αt.
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(ii) When α > αt
a: Let D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 < C ⇒ D1 < C
Then, Rbi = p(D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ) + βpmin
(
D2, C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )
)
. . . (1)
Let D2 ≤ C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )⇒ D2 < C −D1 and D2 < C
Then (1) becomes, Rbi = p(D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ) + βpD2 . . . (2)
and Rci = αpD1 + βpD2 . . . (3)
Thus rearranging equations (2) and (3) and writing Rbi in terms of R
c
i we get,
Rbi = R
c
i − (α− 1)pD1 + pyaOv,j1
Hence Case B(ii)a states that, Rbi ≥ Rci when
• D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 < C ⇒ D1 < C
• D2 ≤ C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )⇒ D2 < C −D1 and D2 < C
• and iﬀ yaOv,j1 − (α− 1)D1 ≥ 0.
b: Let D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 < C ⇒ D1 < C
Let D2 > C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )
Then, Rbi = p(D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ) + βp
(
C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )
)
⇒ Rbi = (1− β)p(D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ) + βpC . . . (4)
and, Rci = αpD1 + βpmin(D2, C −D1) . . . (5)
Let D2 ≥ C −D1, then equation (5) becomes
Rci = αpD1 + βp(C −D1) . . . (6)
Rearranging equations (4) and (6) and writing Rbi in terms of R
c
i , we get
Rbi = R
c
i + (1− β)pyaOv,j1 − (α− 1)pD1
Hence Case B(ii)b states that, Rbi ≥ Rci when
• D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 < C ⇒ D1 < C
• D2 > C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )
• D2 ≥ C −D1
• and iﬀ (1− β)yaOv,j1 − (α− 1)D1 ≥ 0.
c: Let D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 < C ⇒ D1 < C
Let D2 > C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )
Let D2 < C −D1
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Then Rci = αpD1 + βpD2 . . . (7)
Rearranging equations (4) and (7) and writing Rbi in terms of R
c
i , we get
Rbi = R
c
i + βp(C −D2) + (α + β − 1)pD1 + (1− β)pyaOv,j1
Hence Case B(ii)c states that, Rbi ≥ Rci when
• D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 < C ⇒ D1 < C
• D2 > C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )
• D2 < C −D1
• and iﬀ β(C −D2) + (α + β − 1)D1 + (1− β)yaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
d: Let D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ C
Then Rbi = pC . . . (8)
Let D1 ≥ C
Then Rci = αpC . . . (9)
Thus, from equations (8) and (9), Rci = αR
b
i
Since, α > 1⇒ Rci > Rbi
Hence Case B(ii)d states that, Rci > R
b
i when
• D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ C
• and D1 ≥ C.
e: Let D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ C
Let D1 < C
Then Rci = αpD1 + βpmin(D2, C −D1)
Let D2 ≤ C −D1
Then Rci = αpD1 + βpD2 . . . (10)
Thus from equations (8) and (10), we get
Rci = R
b
i + p(αD1 + βD2 − C)
Hence Case B(ii)e states that, Rci ≥ Rbi when
• D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ C
• D1 < C
• D2 ≤ C −D1
• and iﬀ αD1 + βD2 − C ≥ 0.
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f: Let D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ C
Let D1 < C
Let D2 > C −D1
Then, Rci = αpD1 + βp(C −D1) . . . (11)
From equations (8) and (11) we get,
Rci = R
b
i + (α− β)pD1 − (1− β)pC
Hence Case B(ii)f states that, Rci ≥ Rbi when
• D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ C
• D1 < C
• D2 > C −D1
• and iﬀ (α− β)D1 − (1− β)C ≥ 0.
Hence, these tables provide the relationships between the revenues earned in any
two pricing scenarios under all possible conditions that may arise when the min or
max functions are applied in the revenue equations i.e. in equations 5.27 and 5.28.
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Figure 5.1: Case B: Relationship between Rbi and R
c
i
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Table 5.2: Case A: Comparing Rai (R
a
j ) and R
d
i (R
b
j)
Comparing equations 5.13 and 5.28
A(i) When α ≤ αt Rdi > Rai
A(ii) When α > αt
D1 − aOv,j1 > 0
D1 − aOv,j1 ≥ C (a) Rdi > Rai
⇒ D1 > C
D1 − aOv,j1 < C
D2 ≤ C − (D1 − aOv,j1 )
D1 < C
D2 ≤ C −D1
(b) Rdi ≥ Rai iff
(α− 1)D1 − α ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ 0
D2 > C −D1 (c) Rdi ≥ Rai iff
(α+ β − 1)D1 + β(D2 − C)− α ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ 0
D1 ≥ C (d) Rdi ≥ Rai iff
αD1 + βD2 − C − α ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ 0
D2 > C − (D1 − aOv,j1 )
⇒ D2 > C −D1
D1 < C (e) R
d
i ≥ Rai iff
(α− 1)D1 − (α− β)aOv,j1 ≥ 0
D1 ≥ C (f) Rdi ≥ Rai iff
(α− β)(D1 − aOv,j1 ) + (β − 1)C ≥ 0
D1 − aOv,j1 ≤ 0
D2 ≥ C
⇒ D2 > C −D1
D1 < C (g) R
d
i < R
a
i
D1 ≥ C (h) Rdi < Rai
D2 < C
D1 ≥ C (i) Rdi < Rai
D1 < C
D2 ≤ C −D1 (j) Rdi < Rai
D2 > C −D1 (k) Rdi < Rai
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Table 5.3: Case B: Comparing Rbi(R
d
j ) and R
c
i (R
c
j)
Comparing equations 5.27 and 5.14
B(i) When α ≤ αt Rci > Rbi
B(ii) When α > αt
D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 < C
⇒ D1 < C
D2 ≤ C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )
⇒ D2 < C −D1 and D2 < C (a) Rbi ≥ Rci iff
y ∗ aOv,j1 − (α− 1)D1 ≥ 0
D2 > C − (D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 )
D2 ≥ C −D1 (b) Rbi ≥ Rci iff
(1− β)y ∗ aOv,j1 − (α− 1)D1 ≥ 0
D2 < C −D1 (c) Rbi ≥ Rci iff
β(C −D2)− (α + β − 1)D1
+(1− β)y ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ 0
D1 + y ∗ aOv,j1 ≥ C
D1 ≥ C (d) Rci > Rbi
D1 < C
D2 ≤ C −D1 (e) Rci ≥ Rbi iff
αD1 + βD2 − C ≥ 0
D2 > C −D1 (f) Rci ≥ Rbi iff
(α− β)D1 − (1− β)C ≥ 0
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We have shown numerically in Chapter 4 that Nash equilibrium is only achieved
when both the fare-classes of both the airlines are priced identically. Nash equilibrium
is not achieved when the two airlines follow diﬀerent pricing strategies. To prove the
same theoretically we propose the following Lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. Nash equilibrium is not achieved when airline i follows Strategy 1 and
airline j follows Strategy 2 or vice versa, i.e. in Case (b) or Case (d) from Table 5.1.
To prove Lemma 5.1, we show that
When Rbi ≥ Rci , Rbj  Raj and when Rdj ≥ Rcj, Rdi  Rai , or vice versa
Since Rai = R
a
j , R
b
i = R
d
j , R
b
j = R
d
i and R
c
i = R
c
j, hence to show that
Rbi ≥ Rci , but Rdi  Rai or Rdi ≥ Rai , but Rbi  Rci .
The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 5.2. Nash equilibrium may be achieved when both airlines price according
to Strategy 1 i.e. in Cases (a) and (c) from Table 5.1.
To prove Lemma 5.2, we show that
When Rai ≥ Rdi , Raj ≥ Rbj
and,
When Rci ≥ Rbi , Rcj ≥ Rdj
We know that Rai = R
a
j , R
b
i = R
d
j , R
b
j = R
d
i and R
c
i = R
c
j. Hence, R
a
j ≥ Rbj is
equivalent to Rai ≥ Rdi . Similarly, Rcj ≥ Rdj is equivalent to Rci ≥ Rbi .
Thus, Nash equilibrium exists when Strategy 1 is followed.
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5.4 Seat allocation and revenue earned in a three-
strategy pricing policy game
Having proved that NE exists in the two-strategy case when both the competitors
follow an identical pricing strategy, we go on to the three-strategy case. Once again
here, we ﬁrst deﬁne the three-strategy scenario, then determine the seat allocation
and revenues earned in the diﬀerent scenarios and ﬁnally use the best response method
to determine the existence of NE.
Extending Table 5.1 to the three-strategy scenario, we get Table 5.4 which pro-
vides the price variables and parameters adopted to calculate the seat allocations and
revenues earned in a three-strategy Game
Table 5.4: Strategies employed & revenues earned - three strategy case
Airline i
p, βp αp, βp p, αβp
Airlinej
p, βp
Case a Case d Case h
Rai , R
a
j R
d
i , R
d
j R
h
i , R
h
j
αp, βp
Case b Case c Case l
Rbi , R
b
j R
c
i , R
c
j R
l
i, R
l
j
p, αβp
Case g Case k Case e
Rgi , R
g
j R
k
i , R
k
j R
e
i , R
e
j
As mentioned earlier in the two-strategy case, it may be noted from Table 5.4
that in Cases (a), (c) and (e) there will be no overﬂow of passengers, in either Class 1
or Class 2, between the airlines since they are identically priced. Hence the revenues
earned by the two airlines in these cases will be equal, i.e. Rai = R
a
j , R
c
i = R
c
j and
Rei = R
e
j . However in Case (b), the price of Class 1 for airline i is p whereas that for
airline j is αp, hence there will be an overﬂow in Class 1 from airline j to airline i.
Thus, in Case (b), Rbi 6= Rbj. Similarly, in Case (d), there will be an overﬂow in Class
1 from airline i to airline j and hence Rdi 6= Rdj . However, because of the exactly
reverse nature of Cases (b) and (d), we can say that Rbi = R
d
j and R
b
j = R
d
i . Similarly,
Rgi = R
h
j , R
g
j = R
h
i , R
k
i = R
l
j and R
k
j = R
l
i. Continuing with the same assumptions
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for demand distribution and market shares of the competitors as in Section 5.2, we
now determine the seat allocations and revenues earned in Cases (e), (g), (h), (k) and
(l).
5.4.1 Revenues earned in Case (e)
From Table 5.4, the price parameters for Case (e) are pi = pj = p and βpi = βpj =
αβp. Thus using equation 5.12 we get,
Rei = pmin(D1, C) + αβpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
= Rej (5.29)
5.4.2 Revenues earned in Case (g) (Case (h))
For Case (g), pi = pj = p and βpi = βp, βpj = αβp
xg1 = D1 (5.30)
In Class 2, there will be overﬂow from airline j to airline i. Equation (5.25) can
be written as
aOv,j2 = bc1M2 + c2 ∗ (α− αt)βpc , c1 = 1; c2 > 1; (5.31)
ai1,g = min(D1, C) (5.32)
ai2,g = min(D2 + a
Ov,j
2 , C − ai1,g), when α > αt (5.33a)
= min(D2, C − ai1,g), when α ≤ αt (5.33b)
aj1,g = min(D1, C) (5.34)
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aj2,g = min
(
max(D2 − aOv,j2 , 0), C − aj1,g
)
, when α > αt (5.35a)
= min(D2, C − aj1,g), when α ≤ αt (5.35b)
Combining equations 5.32, 5.33, 5.34 and 5.35 we get,
Rgi = pmin(D1, C) + βpmin
(
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 , C −min(D1, C)
)
, when α > αt (5.36a)
= pmin(D1, C) + βpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
, when α ≤ αt (5.36b)
= Rhj (5.36c)
Rgj = pmin(D1, C) + αβpmin
(
max(D2 − aOv,j2 , 0), C −min(D1, C)
)
, when α > αt
(5.37a)
= pmin(D1, C) + αβpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
, when α ≤ αt
(5.37b)
= Rhi (5.37c)
5.4.3 Revenues earned in Case (k) (Case (l))
For Case (k), pi = αp, pj = p, βpi = βp and βpj = αβp. Hence, in Class 1, overﬂow
occurs from airline i to j and in Class 2, overﬂow occurs from airline j to i.
aOv,i1 = bc1M1 + c2 ∗ (α− αt)pc , c1 = 1; c2 > 1; (5.38)
It may be noted from equations 5.38 and 5.26 that aOv,i1 = a
Ov,j
1 . Hence, we write
aOv,j1 instead of a
Ov,i
1 in all further equations.
So, minimum demand in Class 1 for airline i is,
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aik = D1 − aOv,j1 (5.39)
Maximum demand in Class 1 for airline i is,
bik = D1 (5.40)
xi1,k = D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 , when α > αt (5.41a)
= D1, when α ≤ αt (5.41b)
ai1,k = min
(
max(D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 , 0), C
)
, when α > αt (5.42a)
= min(D1, C), when α ≤ αt (5.42b)
ai2,k = min
(
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 , C −min
(
max(D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 , 0), C
))
, when α > αt
(5.43a)
= min
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
, when α ≤ αt
(5.43b)
From equations 5.42 and 5.43 and since pi = αp and βpi = βp we get,
Rki = αpmin a
i
1,k + βpa
i
1,k (5.44a)
= Rlj (5.44b)
where, ai1,k and a
i
2,k are as mentioned in equations 5.42 and 5.43 respectively, with
and without overﬂow.
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For Case l, pi = p, pj = αp, βpi = αβp and βpj = βp. Hence, in Class 1, overﬂow
occurs from airline j to i and in Class 2, overﬂow occurs from airline i to j.
Minimum demand in Class 1 for airline l is,
ail = D1 (5.45)
Maximum demand in Class 1 for airline i is,
bil = D1 + a
Ov,j
1 (5.46)
xi1,l = D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 , when α > αt (5.47a)
= D1, when α ≤ αt (5.47b)
ai1,l = min(D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 , C), when α > αt (5.48a)
= min(D1, C), when α ≤ αt (5.48b)
ai2,l = min
(
max(D2 − aOv,j2 , 0), C −min(D1 + yaOv,j1 , C)
)
, when α > αt (5.49a)
= min
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
, when α ≤ αt (5.49b)
From equations 5.48 and 5.49 and since pi = p and βpi = αβp we get,
Rli = pmin(D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 , C) + αβpmin
(
max(D2 − aOv,j2 , 0), C −min(D1 + yaOv,j1 , C)
)
, when α > αt
(5.50a)
= pmin(D1, C) + αβpmin
(
D2, C −min(D1, C)
)
, when α ≤ αt
(5.50b)
= Rkj (5.50c)
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5.5 Finding NE - the three-strategy case
Similar to Section 5.3, here too we tabulate the relationships between the necessary
revenues in airlines i and j. Hence we need to determine the following relationships
in the three-strategy case. Case C is also diagrammatically depicted in Figure 5.2
A: Relationship between Rai (R
a
j ) and R
d
i (R
b
j) (refer Table 5.2)
B: Relationship between Rbi(R
d
j ) and R
c
i (R
c
j) (refer Table 5.3)
C: Relationship between Rai (R
a
j ) and R
h
i (R
g
j ) (refer Table 5.5)
D: Relationship between Rdi (R
b
j) and R
h
i (R
g
j ) (refer Table 5.6)
E: Relationship between Rbi(R
d
j ) and R
l
i(R
k
j ) (refer Table 5.7)
F: Relationship between Rci (R
c
j) and R
l
i(R
k
j ) (refer Table 5.8)
G: Relationship between Rgi (R
h
j ) and R
k
i (R
l
j) (refer Table 5.9)
H: Relationship between Rgi (R
h
j ) and R
e
i (R
e
j) (refer Table 5.10)
I: Relationship between Rei (R
e
j) and R
k
i (R
l
j) (refer Table 5.11)
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Figure 5.2: Case C: Relationship between Rai and R
h
i
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Table 5.5: Case C: Comparing Rai (R
a
j ) and R
h
i (R
g
j )
Comparing equations 5.13 and 5.37
C(i) When α ≤ αt Rhi > Rai
C(ii) When α > αt
D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0
D2 ≥ C −min(D1, C) (a)Rhi > Rai
D2 < C −min(D1, C)
⇒ D1 < C (b) Rhi > Rai
D2 − aOv,j2 > 0
D2 − aOv,j2 > C −min(D1, C)
⇒ D2 > C −min(D1, C) (c) Rhi > Rai
D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ C −min(D1, C)
⇒ D1 ≤ C
D2 > C −D1 (d) Rhi ≥ Rai iff
α(D2 − aOv,j2 )− C +D1 ≥ 0
D2 < C −D1 (e) Rhi ≥ Rai iff
(α− 1)D2 − α ∗ aOv,j2 ≥ 0
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Table 5.6: Case D: Comparing Rdi (R
b
j) and R
h
i (R
g
j )
Comparing equations 5.28 and 5.37
D(i) When α ≤ αt D1 ≥ C (a) Rdi > Rhi
D1 < C D2 ≥ C −D1 (b) Rdi ≥ Rhi iff
(1 + β)D1 − βC ≥ 0
D2 < C −D1 (c) Rdi ≥ Rhi iff
D1 − βD2 ≥ 0
D(ii) When α > αt
D1 − aOv,j1 ≤ 0
D2 ≥ C
D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0
D1 ≥ C (a) Rhi > Rdi
D1 < C (b) R
h
i ≥ Rdi iff
D1 − βC ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 > 0
D1 ≥ C (c) Rhi > Rdi
D1 < C
D2 − aOv,j2 ≥ C −D1 (d) Rhi ≥ Rdi iff
(1− αβ)D1 + (α− 1)βC ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 < C −D1 (e) Rhi ≥ Rdi iff
αβD2 +D1 − βC − αβaOv,j2 ≥ 0
D2 < C
D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0
D1 ≥ C (f) Rhi > Rdi
D1 < C (g) R
h
i ≥ Rdi iff
D1 − βD2 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 > 0
D1 ≥ C (h) Rhi > Rdi
D1 < C (i) R
h
i ≥ Rdi iff
(1 + αβD1) + αβC − βD2 ≥ 0
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D(ii) α > αt
D1 − aOv,j1 > 0
D1 − aOv,j1 ≥ C
⇒ D1 > C
D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0 (j) Rhi < Rdi
D2 − aOv,j2 > 0 (k) Rhi < Rdi
D1 − aOv,j1 < C
D2 ≥ C − (D1 − aOv,j1 )
D1 ≥ C (l) Rhi ≥ Rdi iff
(1− β)C − (α− β)(D1 − aOv,j1 ) ≥ 0
D2 ≥ C − (D1 − aOv,j1 )
D1 < C
D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0 (m) Rhi ≥ Rdi iff
(1− α− β)D1 + βC + (α+ β)aOv,j1 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 > 0 (n) Rhi ≥ Rdi iff
(1− α)(1 + β)D1 + (α− β)aOv,j1
−(1− α)βC ≥ 0
D2 < C − (D1 − aOv,j1 )
D1 ≥ C (o) Rhi ≥ Rdi iff
αD1 + βD2 − C − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0
D1 < C
D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0 (p) Rdi ≥ Rhi iff
(α− 1)D1 + βD2 − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 > 0 (q) Rdi ≥ Rhi iff
(α+ αβ − 1)D1 + βD2 − αβC − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0
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Table 5.7: Case E: Comparing Rbi(R
d
j ) and R
l
i(R
k
j )
Comparing equations 5.27 and 5.50
E(i) When α ≤ αt Rli > Rbi
E(ii) When α > αt
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 ≥ C (a) Rbi = Rli
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 < C
D2 ≥ C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 )
D2 − aOv,j2 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 ≥ C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ) (b) Rli > Rbi
D2 − aOv,j2 < C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ) (c) Rli ≥ Rbi iff
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 − C
+α(D2 − aOv,j2 ) ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 < 0 (d)Rli < Rbi
D2 < C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 )
D2 − aOv,j2 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 ≥ C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ) (e) Rbi ≥ Rli iff
α(D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 − C) +D2 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 < C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ) (f) Rbi ≥ Rli iff
(1− α)D2 + αaOv,j2 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 < 0 (g)Rbi > Rli
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Table 5.8: Case F: Comparing Rci (R
c
j) and R
l
i(R
k
j )
Comparing equations 5.14 and 5.50
F(i) When α ≤ αt Rci ≥ Rli iff
min(D1, C)− βmin(D2, C −min(D1, C)) ≥ 0
F(ii) When α > αt
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 ≤ C
⇒ D1 < C
D2 ≤ C −D1
D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0 (a) Rci ≥ Rli iff
(α− 1)D1 + βD2 − yaOv,j1 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 > 0
D2 − aOv,j2 ≥ C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ) (b) Rci ≥ Rli iff
(α+ αβ − 1)D1 + βD2 − αβC
−(1− αβ)yaOv,j1 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 < C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ) (c) Rci ≥ Rli iff
(α− 1)D1 − (α− 1)βD2 − yaOv,j1
+αβaOv,j2 ≥ 0
D2 > C −D1
D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0 (d) Rci ≥ Rli iff
(α− β)D1 + βC −D1 − yaOv,j1 ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 > 0
D2 − aOv,j2 ≥ C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ) (e) Rc− ≥ Rli iff
D1 + β(D1 − C) ≥ 0
D2 − aOv,j2 < C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ) (f) Rci ≥ Rli iff
(α− 1)D1 + β(C −D1)− αβ(D2 − aOv,j2 )
−yaOv,j1 ≥ 0
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 > C
D1 ≥ C (g) Rci > Rli
D1 < C
D2 ≥ C −D1 (h) Rci ≥ Rli iff (α− β)D1 − (1− β)C ≥ 0
D2 < C −D1 (i) Rci ≥ Rli iff αD1 + βD2 − C ≥ 0
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Table 5.9: Case G: Comparing Rgi (R
h
j ) and R
k
i (R
l
j)
Comparing equations 5.36 and 5.44
G(i) When α ≤ αt Rki < Rgi
G(ii) When α > αt
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 ≤ 0
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 ≥ C
D1 ≥ C (a) Rki < Rgi
D1 < C
D2 ≥ C −D1 (b) Rki < Rgi
D2 < C −D1 (c) Rki ≥ Rgi iff
D1 + β(D2 − C) ≥ 0
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 < C
D1 ≥ C (d) Rki < Rgi
D1 < C
D2 ≥ C −D1 (e) Rgi > Rki
D2 < C −D1 (f) Rgi ≥ Rki iff
D1 − βaOv,j2 ≥ 0
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 > 0
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 ≥ C
⇒ D1 > C (g) Rki > Rgi
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 < C
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 ≥ C − (D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 )
⇒ D2 + aOv,j2 > C −D1 D1 ≥ C (h) Rgi ≥ Rci iff
(1− β)C
−(α− β)(D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 ) ≥ 0
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G(ii) α > αt
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 > 0
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 < C
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 ≥ C − (D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 )
⇒ D2 + aOv,j2 > C −D1
D1 < C (i) R
g
i ≥ Rki iff
(α− β)(1− y)aOv,j1
−(α− 1)D1 ≥ 0
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 < C −
(
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1
)
D1 ≥ C (j) Rgi ≥ Rki iff
C − α
(
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1
)
−β(D2 + aOv,j2 ) ≥ 0
D1 < C
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 ≥ C −D1 (k) Rgi ≥ Rki iff
βC + α(1− y)aOv,j1
−(α+ β − 1)D1
−β(D2 + aOv,j2 ) ≥ 0
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 < C −D1 (l) Rgi ≥ Rki iff
α(1− y)aOv,j1
−(α− 1)D1 ≥ 0
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Table 5.10: Case H: Comparing Rgi (R
h
j ) and R
e
i (R
e
j)
Comparing equations 5.36 and 5.29
H(i) When α ≤ αt Rei > Rgi
H(ii) When α > αt
D1 ≥ C (a) Rei = Rgi
D1 < C
D2 ≥ C −D1
⇒ D2 + aOv,j2 > C −D1 (b) Rei > Rgi
D2 < C −D1
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 ≥ C −D1 (c) Rei ≥ Rgi iff
D1 + αD2 − C ≥ 0
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 < C −D1 (d) Rei ≥ Rgi iff
(α− 1)D2 − aOv,j2 ≥ 0
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Table 5.11: Case I: Comparing Rki (R
l
j) and R
e
i (R
e
j)
Comparing equations 5.44 and 5.29
I(i) When α ≤ αt
D1 ≥ C (a) Rki > Rei
D1 < C
D2 ≥ C −D1 (b) Rki geqRei iff
(1 = β)D1 − βC ≥ 0
D2 < C −D1 (c) Rki ≥ Rei iff
D1 − βD2 ≥ 0
I(ii) When α > αt
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 ≤ 0
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 ≥ C
D1 ≥ C (a) Rki < Rei
D1 < C
D2 ≥ C −D1 (b) Rki ≥ Rei iff
(αβ − 1)D1 − (α− 1)βC ≥ 0
D2 < C −D1 (c) Rki ≥ Rei iff
βC −D1 − αβD2 ≥ 0
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 < C
D1 ≥ C (d) Rki < Rei
D1 < C
D2 ≥ C −D1 (e) Rei ≥ Rki iff
(1− αβ)D1 + αβC − β(D2 + aOv,j2 ) ≥ 0
D2 < C −D1 (f) Rei ≥ Rki iff
D1 = β(α− 1)D2 − βaOv,j2 ≥ 0
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I(ii) α > αt
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 > 0
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 ≥ C
⇒ D1 > C (g) Rki > Rei
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 < C
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 ≥ C − (D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 )
D1 ≥ C (h) Rki > Rei
D1 < C
D2 ≥ C −D1 (i) Rei ≥ Rki iff
(α− 1)βC − (α− 1)(1 + β)D1
+(α− β)(1− y)aOv,j1 ≥ 0
D2 < C −D1 (j) Rei ≥ Rki iff
(α− β)(1− y)aOv,j1 − βC
−(α− β − 1)D1 + βD2 ≥ 0
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 < C − (D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 )
D1 ≥ C (k) Rei ≥ Rki iff
C − β(D2 + aOv,j2 )
−α(D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 ) ≥ 0
D1 < C
D2 ≥ C −D1 (l) Rei ≥ Rki iff
(1− α− αβ)D1 + αβC
−α(1− y)aOv,j1 − β(D2 + aOv,j2 ) ≥ 0
D2 < C −D1 (m) Rei ≥ Rki iff
α(1− y)aOv,j1 − (α− 1)D1
+(α− 1)βD2 − βaOv,j2 ≥ 0
5.5 Finding NE - the three-strategy case 86
To prove the existence of NE in the three-strategy scenario, we propose the fol-
lowing Lemmas.
Lemma 5.3. Nash equilibrium is not achieved when airline i follows Strategy 1 and
airline j follows Strategy 2 or vice versa, i.e. in Case (b) or Case (d) from Table 5.4.
To prove Lemma 5.3, we show that
when Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ), Rdi (Rbj)  Rhi (Rgj ) or vice versa.
Or
When Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ) and Rdi (Rbj) ≥ Rhi (Rgj ), Rdj (Rbi)  Rcj(Rci ) and/or Rdj (Rbi) 
Rkj (R
l
i).
The detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
Lemma 5.4. Nash equilibrium is not achieved when airline i follows Strategy 1 and
airline j follows Strategy 3 or vice versa, i.e. in Case (g) or Case (h) from Table 5.4.
To prove Lemma 5.4, we show that
when Rhi (R
g
j ) ≥ Rai (Raj ), Rhi (Rgj )  Rdi (Rbj) or vice versa.
Or
when Rhi (R
g
j ) ≥ Rai (Raj ) and Rhi (Rgj ) ≥ Rdi (Rbj), Rhj (Rgi )  Rlj(Rki ) and/or Rhj (Rgi ) 
Rej(R
e
i ).
The detailed proof is provided in Appendix C.
Lemma 5.5. Nash equilibrium is not achieved when airline i follows Strategy 2 and
airline j follows Strategy 3 or vice versa, i.e. in Case (k) or Case (l) from Table 5.4.
To prove Lemma 5.5, we show that
When Rli(R
k
j ) ≥ Rci (Rcj), Rli(Rkj )  Rbi(Rdj ) or vice versa
Or
When Rli(R
k
j ) ≥ Rci (Rcj) and Rli(Rkj ) ≥ Rbi(Rdj ), Rlj(Rki )  Rhj (Rgi ) and/or Rlj(Rki ) 
Rej(R
e
i ).
The detailed proof is provided in Appendix D.
Proposition 5.6. From Lemmas 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, we can conclude that Nash equi-
librium is not achieved when the airlines follow diﬀerent pricing strategies.
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Lemma 5.7. Nash equilibrium may be achieved when both airlines price according
to Strategy 1 i.e. in Cases (a), (c) and (e) from Table 5.4.
To prove Lemma 5.7, we show that
1. When Rai ≥ Rdi , Raj ≥ Rbj
And / or
When Rai ≥ Rhi , Raj ≥ Rgj .
2. When Rci ≥ Rbi , Rcj ≥ Rdj
And / or
When Rci ≥ Rli, Rcj ≥ Rkj
3. When Rei ≥ Rgi , Rej ≥ Rhj
And / or
When Rei ≥ Rki , Rej ≥ Rlj
The detailed proof is provided in Appendix E.
Proposition 5.8. From Lemma 5.7, we can conclude that Nash equilibrium may be
achieved only when both the airlines i and j price both fare-classes identically.
5.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we determine theoretically the seat allocations and revenues earned
in the two-strategy and three-strategy pricing scenarios. We show that for both the
two-strategy and the three-strategy pricing scenarios NE is achieved only when both
the players in a duopoly follow the same pricing strategy. Hence, we can say that when
two competitors follow more-than-two pricing strategies, NE is always achieved when
both the players price identically i.e when the competitors follow identical pricing
strategies.
Chapter 6
Final conclusion
In this thesis we have deﬁned and solved the problem of seat allocation and pricing
in the airline industry in the case of horizontal competition between two airlines.
In horizontal competition, the competing airlines ﬂy the same ﬂight leg between an
origin and a destination and operate ﬂights within minutes of each other. In our
problem, the competing airlines each have two fare-classes. The competitors strive to
maximize their revenues by optimally allocating seats for high and low fare-classes.
We consider that the same fare-class may be priced diﬀerently by the competitors
and there occurs a price-based overﬂow of customers from one airline to the other
when the price rises above a predeﬁned threshold price.
In Chapter 3, we mathematically model the problem of seat allocation to maxi-
mize the revenue earned by one of the airlines. Numerical computations are performed
and the results obtained from our model is compared with the results obtained when
EMSR is used for seat allocation. We conclude that the revenue earned by our model
is consistently higher than the revenue earned by EMSR that considers a monopo-
listic scenario. We also note that as the price diﬀerential between the competitors
for the high fare-class increase, the lower priced competitor allocates less seats for
the lower fare-class to increase the revenue earned. Also, the booking limit i.e. the
no. of seats reserved for the lower fare-class is less in a competitive scenario than in
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a monopoly. This result, though in line with the results obtained by existing liter-
ature, is contrary to common belief that competition favors the customer. We also
note that a price-based overﬂow allows the lower priced airline to earn higher revenues.
In Chapter 4, we formulate our problem as a Game where the two airlines are the
players in a non-cooperative game. Each of the competitors have information about
their own and the competitors market share, airline capacity, no. of fare-classes,
times at which their ﬂights operate, the fare price at the time of booking and the
average demand of the high and low fare-classes. However, they only know the seat
allocation for each of the fare-classes for their own airline and not of their competitor.
Four pricing strategies are deﬁned and the seat allocation and revenues earned by the
two airlines when they follow each of those strategies is numerically determined. We
also determine the strategy/strategies under which a Nash equilibrium is achieved.
Through the numerical computations, we show that NE is achieved only when both
the airlines follow the same strategy i.e. when both the fare-classes of both airlines
are priced identically. This implies that the airlines do not stand to gain by under-
cutting the competition. However, competitively, lower price than the competition
can be used as a means to gain market share in the long run.
In Chapter 5, we prove theoretically the validity of the results obtained from our
numerical computations to show that NE is achieved only when both the competitors
follow the same strategy.
From Chapter 3, where we develop the mathematical model and compare our re-
sults with those obtained with a monopolistic market assumption, we conclude that
customers fare better in a monopolistic scenario than in a competitive scenario. This
is quite contrary to popular belief. We conclude this from the fact that more low
fare seats are reserved for passengers in a monopolistic scenario than in a competitive
scenario. This part also shows that the airline which has both of its fare-classes priced
lower than its competitor or, has one fare-class at same price as the competitor but the
other at a lower price, earns higher revenues than its competitor, provided that the
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customer has a choice to move to the airline with the lower priced fare-class. Chapter
4 provides the insight that a Nash equilibrium only exists when both the airlines
follow the same strategy and operate at the same prices. This proves that airlines
do not stand to gain by undercutting the competition. However, competitively, lower
price than the competition can be used as a means to gain market share in the long
run. The theoretical proof in Chapter 5 conﬁrms that the insights obtained from the
numerical computations of Chapter 4 stand universally true for all parameters of the
problem deﬁned here.
In the future, we would like to study whether a pure strategy NE exists when
more than two airlines compete. We would also like to consider overﬂow between
fare-classes and not restricted to the same fare-class and consider buy-up, buy-down,
cancellations and return of lost customers to their ﬁrst choice airline.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 5.1
To show that
Rbi ≥ Rci , but Rdi  Rai or Rdi ≥ Rai , but Rbi  Rci .
1 When α ≤ αt, from Case A(i) we get Rdi > Rai and from B(i) we get Rbi < Rci .
2 When α > αt,
a) Case B(ii)a states that Rbi ≥ Rci when D1 + y(aOv,j1 ) < C ⇒ D1 < C, D2 ≤
C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 )⇒ D2 < C −D1 & D2 < C, and iff yaOv,j1 − (α− 1)D1 ≥ 0.
Case A(ii)b is the only situation where all the conditions are equivalent to those
in B(ii)a and Rdi ≥ Rai , iff (α− 1)D1 − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0
For the above 2 cases to be feasible together, all the equations (A.1) should
be feasible. Thus checking the feasibility of the following equations using the
Fourier Motzkin elimination:
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−D1 + aOv,j1 < 0 (A.1a)
D1 − C − aOv,j1 < 0 (A.1b)
D2 − C +D1 − aOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.1c)
D1 − C < 0 (A.1d)
D2 − C +D1 ≤ 0 (A.1e)
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 − C < 0 (A.1f)
D2 − C +D1 + yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.1g)
− (α− 1)D1 + αaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.1h)
(α− 1)D1 − yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.1i)
Adding equations (A.1h) and (A.1i), we get
(α− y)aOv,j1 ≤ 0
However, we know that α > y & aOv,j1 > 0, hence (α− y)aOv,j1 > 0
Thus, the equations (A.1) are not feasible.
b) Case B(ii)b states that Rbi ≥ Rci when D1 + yaOv,j1 < C ⇒ D1 < C, D2 >
C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ), D2 > C −D1 and iff (1− β)yaOv,j1 + (1− α)D1 ≥ 0.
• In Case A(ii)c, all the conditions are equivalent to those in B(ii)b and
Rdi ≥ Rai , iff (α + β − 1)D1 + β(D2 − C)− αaOv,j1 ≥ 0
Checking the feasibility of the following equations using the Fourier Motzkin
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elimination:
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 − C < 0 (A.2a)
D1 − C < 0 (A.2b)
−D1 − yaOv,j1 + C −D2 < 0 (A.2c)
−D1 + C −D2 < 0 (A.2d)
−D1 + aOv,j1 < 0 (A.2e)
D1 − aOv,j1 − C < 0 (A.2f)
D1 − C − aOv,j1 +D2 ≤ 0 (A.2g)
(α− 1)D1 − (1− β)yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.2h)
− (α + β − 1)D1 − β(D2 − C) + αaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.2i)
Adding equations (B.2h) and (B.2i), we get
−β(D1 +D2 − C)− (1− β)yaOv,j1 + αaOv,j1 ≤ 0
Adding & subtracting βaOv,j1 to the above inequality, we get
−β(D1 +D2 − C − aOv,j1 ) + (α− y)aOv,j1 + (1− y)βaOv,j1 < 0
However, from (B.2g) we get that −β(D1 +D2 − C − aOv,j1 ) ≥ 0. Also, we
know that (α− y)aOv,j1 > 0 and (1− y)βaOv,j1 > 0
⇒ −β(D1 +D2 − C − aOv,j1 ) + (α− y)aOv,j1 + (1− y)βaOv,j1 > 0.
Thus, the equations (B.2) are not feasible.
• In case A(ii)e, all the conditions are equivalent to those in B(ii)b and Rdi ≥
Rai , iff −(α− 1)D1 + (α− β)aOv,j1 ≤ 0
Checking the feasibility of the following equations using the Fourier Motzkin
94
elimination:
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 − C < 0 (A.3a)
D1 − C < 0 (A.3b)
−D1 − yaOv,j1 + C −D2 < 0 (A.3c)
−D1 + C −D2 < 0 (A.3d)
−D1 + aOv,j1 < 0 (A.3e)
D1 − aOv,j1 − C < 0 (A.3f)
−D1 + C + aOv,j1 −D2 < 0 (A.3g)
(α− 1)D1 − (1− β)yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.3h)
− (α− 1)D1 + (α− β)aOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.3i)
Adding equations (A.3h) and (A.3i), we get
(
(α− β)− (1− β)y)aOv,j1 ≤ 0
Since α > 1, 0 < β < 1 and 0 < y < 1,
(
(α− β)− (1− β)y)aOv,j1 > 0
Thus, the equations (A.3) are not feasible.
c) Case B(ii)c states that Rbi ≥ Rci when D1 + yaOv,j1 < C ⇒ D1 < C, D2 >
C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ), D2 < C −D1 and iff − (α+ β − 1)D1 + β(C −D2) + (1−
β)yaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
Case A(ii)b is the only situation where all the conditions are equivalent to those
in B(ii)c and Rdi ≥ Rai , iff (α− 1)D1 − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0
For the above 2 cases to be feasible together, all the equations (A.4) should
be feasible. Thus checking the feasibility of the following equations using the
Fourier Motzkin elimination:
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D1 − C + yaOv,j1 < 0 (A.4a)
D1 − C < 0 (A.4b)
−D1 + C −D2 − yaOv,j1 < 0 (A.4c)
D1 − C +D2 ≤ 0 (A.4d)
−D1 + aOv,j1 < 0 (A.4e)
D1 − C − aOv,j1 < 0 (A.4f)
D1 − C +D2 − aOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.4g)
(α + β − 1)D1 − β(C −D2)− (1− β)yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.4h)
− (α− 1)D1 + αaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.4i)
Adding (A.4h) and (A.4i) we get,
β(D1 − C +D2 + yaOv,j1 ) + (α− y)aOv,j1 ≤ 0
From (A.4c), we know that β(D1−C+D2+ yaOv,j1 ) > 0. Also, (α− y)aOv,j1 > 0
Thus, β(D1 − C +D2 + yaOv,j1 ) + (α− y)aOv,j1 > 0
Hence, the equations (A.4) are not feasible.
d) Case B(ii)e states that Rbi ≥ Rci when D1 + yaOv,j1 ≥ C, D1 < C, D2 ≤
C −D1 and iff αD1 + βD2 − C ≤ 0.
Case A(ii)b is the only situation where all the conditions are equivalent to those
in B(ii)e and Rdi ≥ Rai , iff (α− 1)D1 − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0
For the above 2 cases to be feasible together, all the equations (A.5) should
be feasible. Thus checking the feasibility of the following equations using the
Fourier Motzkin elimination:
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−D1 + C − yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.5a)
D1 − C < 0 (A.5b)
D1 − C +D2 ≤ 0 (A.5c)
−D1 + aOv,j1 < 0 (A.5d)
D1 − C − aOv,j1 < 0 (A.5e)
D1 − C +D2 − aOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.5f)
αD1 + βD2 − C ≤ 0 (A.5g)
− (α− 1)D1 + αaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.5h)
Adding equations (A.5g) and (A.5h), we get
C −D1 ≥ βD2 + αaOv,j1
From equation (A.5a), we know that yaOv,j1 ≥ C −D1
Therefore, yaOv,j1 ≥ βD2 + αaOv,j1
⇒ βD2 + (α− y)aOv,j1 ≤ 0
We know that, D2 > 0 and (α− y)aOv,j1 > 0⇒ βD2 + (α− y)aOv,j1 > 0
Thus, equations (A.5) are not feasible.
e) Case B(ii)f states that Rbi ≥ Rci when D1 + yaOv,j1 ≥ C, D1 < C, D2 >
C −D1 and iff (α− β)D1 − (1− β)C ≤ 0.
• In Case A(ii)c, all the conditions are equivalent to those in B(ii)f and Rdi ≥
Rai , iff (α + β − 1)D1 + β(D2 − C)− αaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
For the above 2 cases to be feasible together, all the equations (A.6) should
be feasible. Checking the feasibility of the following equations using the
Fourier Motzkin elimination:
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−D1 + C − yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.6a)
D1 − C < 0 (A.6b)
−D1 + C −D2 < 0 (A.6c)
D1 − C +D2 − aOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.6d)
−D1 + aOv,j1 < 0 (A.6e)
D1 − C − aOv,j1 < 0 (A.6f)
(α− β)D1 − (1− β)C ≤ 0 (A.6g)
(1− α)D1 − β(D1 +D2 − C) + αaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.6h)
Multiplying equation (A.6e) with (1− α) and adding it to equation (A.6h)
we get,
−β(D1 +D2 − C) + aOv,j1 < 0
Multiplying equation (A.6d) with β and adding to the above equation we
get,
(1− β)aOv,j1 < 0
We know that (1− β) > 0 and aOv,j1 > 0. Thus, (1− β)aOv,j1 > 0.
Thus equations (A.6) are not feasible.
• In case A(ii)e, all the conditions are equivalent to those in B(ii)f and Rdi ≥
Rai , iff (1− α)D1 + (α− β)aOv,j1 ≤ 0
Checking the feasibility of the following equations using the Fourier Motzkin
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elimination:
−D1 + C − yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.7a)
D1 − C < 0 (A.7b)
−D1 + c−D2 < 0 (A.7c)
−D1 + aOv,j1 < 0 (A.7d)
D1 − C − aOv,j1 < 0 (A.7e)
−D1 + C −D2 + aOv,j1 < 0 (A.7f)
(α− β)D1 − (1− β)C ≤ 0 (A.7g)
(1− α)D1 + (α− β)aOv,j1 ≤ 0 (A.7h)
Multiplying equation (B.3d) with (1−α) and adding to equation (B.3h) we
get,
(1− β)aOv,j1 < 0
We know that (1− β) > 0 and aOv,j1 > 0. Thus, (1− β)aOv,j1 > 0.
Thus equations (B.3) are not feasible.
Hence Lemma 5.1 is proved.
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 5.3
To show that
When Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ), Rdi (Rbj)  Rhi (Rgj ) or vice versa.
Or
WhenRdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ) andRdi (Rbj) ≥ Rhi (Rgj ), Rdj (Rbi)  Rcj(Rci ) and/orRdj (Rbi) 
Rkj (R
l
i).
1. When α ≤ αt
a) From Case A(i), we get Rdi (R
b
j) > R
a
i (R
a
j ).
Case D(i)a) states that when D1 ≥ C, Rdi (Rbj) > Rhi (Rgj ).
To check whether under the same conditions, Rdj (R
b
i) ≥ Rcj(Rci ) and/orRdj (Rbi) ≥
Rkj (R
l
i).
From Cases B and E, it is seen that when α ≤ αt, Rbi(Rdj ) < Rci (Rcj) and
Rbi(R
d
j ) < R
l
i(R
k
j ) respectively.
Thus we can conclude that Rdi , R
d
j and R
b
i , R
b
j are not a Nash equilibrium points
when α ≤ αt.
2. When α > αt
a) From Case A(ii)a), Rdi (R
b
j) > R
a
i (R
a
j ) when D1 − aOv,j1 > 0, D1 − aOv,j1 ≥ C ⇒
D1 > C
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Under the same conditions, from Case D(ii)j), Rdi (R
b
j) > R
h
i (R
g
j )
To check whether under the same conditions, Rdj (R
b
i) ≥ Rcj(Rci ) and/orRdj (Rbi) ≥
Rkj (R
l
i).
From Case B(ii)d), when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 ≥ C and D1 ≥ C, Rbi(Rdj ) < Rci (Rcj).
Hence, under these conditions Rdi , R
d
j and R
b
i , R
b
j are not Nash equilibrium
points.
b) From Case A(ii)b), Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ), when D1 − aOv,j1 > 0, D1 − aOv,j1 < C,
D2 ≤ C− (D1− aOv,j1 ), D1 < C, D2 ≤ C−D1 and iff (α− 1)D1−αaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
From Case D(ii)p), Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rhi (Rgj ), when D1 − aOv,j1 > 0, D1 − aOv,j1 < C,
D2 ≤ C − (D1 − aOv,j1 ), D1 < C, D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0 and iff (α − 1)D1 + βD2 −
αaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
From B(ii)a), Rbi(R
d
j ) ≥ Rci (Rcj), when D1 + yaOv,j1 < C, D1 < C, D2 ≤
C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ), D2 ≤ C −D1, D2 < C and iff − (α− 1)D1 + yaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
From Case E(ii)g), Rbi(R
d
j ) > R
l
i(R
k
j ), when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 < C ⇒ D1 < C,
D2 ≤ C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ) and D2 − aOv,j2 < 0.
For all the conditions to hold together, all the above equations should be feasible
simultaneously. Since, all conditions except the iff conditions are equivalent,
we apply Fourier-Motzkin elimination to equations B.1:
−(α− 1)D1 + αaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (B.1a)
−(α− 1)D1 + αaOv,j1 − βD2 ≤ 0 (B.1b)
(α− 1)D1 − yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (B.1c)
Adding equations B.1a and B.1c, we get
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(α− y)aOv,j1 ≤ 0
However, since α > 1 and 0 < y < 1, (α − y) > 0 and aOv,j1 > 0. Hence,
(α− y)aOv,j1  0.
Thus equations B.1 are not feasible and hence under these conditions, Rdi , R
d
j
and Rbi , R
b
j are not Nash equilibrium points.
c) From Case A(ii)c), Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ), when D2 > C − D1, D1 < C, D2 ≤
C − (D1 − aOv,j1 ), D1 − aOv,j1 > 0 and iff (α− 1)D1 + βD2 − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
From Case D(ii)p, Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rhi (Rgj ), whenD1−aOv,j1 > 0, D1−aOv,j1 < C, D2 ≤
C−(D1−aOv,j1 ), D1 < C, D2−aOv,j2 ≤ 0 and iff (α−1)D1+βD2−αaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
From Case D(ii)q, Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rhi (Rgj ), when D1 − aOv,j1 > 0, D1 − aOv,j1 < C,
D2 ≤ C − (D1 − aOv,j1 ), D1 < C, D2 − aOv,j2 > 0 and iff (α + αβ − 1)D1 +
βD2 − αβC − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
From Case B(ii)b, Rbi(R
d
j ) ≥ Rci (Rcj) when D1 + yaOv,j1 < C ⇒ D1 < C, D2 >
C − (D1 + yaOv,j1 ), D2 > C −D1 and iff (1− β)yaOv,j1 + (1− α)D1 ≥ 0.
From Case E(ii)d, Rbi(R
d
j ) > R
c
i (R
c
j) when D2 − aOv,j2 < 0, D2 ≥ C − (D1 +
yaOv,j1 ), D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 < C.
Checking the feasibility of the Cases A(ii)c and B(ii)b using the Fourier Motzkin
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elimination:
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 − C < 0 (B.2a)
D1 − C < 0 (B.2b)
−D1 − yaOv,j1 + C −D2 < 0 (B.2c)
−D1 + C −D2 < 0 (B.2d)
−D1 + aOv,j1 < 0 (B.2e)
D1 − aOv,j1 − C < 0 (B.2f)
D1 − C − aOv,j1 +D2 ≤ 0 (B.2g)
(α− 1)D1 − (1− β)yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (B.2h)
− (α + β − 1)D1 − β(D2 − C) + αaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (B.2i)
Adding equations (B.2h) and (B.2i), we get
−β(D1 +D2 − C)− (1− β)yaOv,j1 + αaOv,j1 ≤ 0
Adding & subtracting βaOv,j1 to the above inequality, we get
−β(D1 +D2 − C − aOv,j1 ) + (α− y)aOv,j1 + (1− y)βaOv,j1 < 0
However, from (B.2g) we get that −β(D1+D2−C−aOv,j1 ) ≥ 0. Also, we know
that (α− y)aOv,j1 > 0 and (1− y)βaOv,j1 > 0
⇒ −β(D1 +D2 − C − aOv,j1 ) + (α− y)aOv,j1 + (1− y)βaOv,j1 > 0.
Thus, the equations (B.2) are not feasible i.e when, Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ), Rdj (Rbi) 
Rcj(R
c
i ). Thus under these conditions R
d
i , R
d
j and R
b
i , R
b
j are not Nash equilib-
rium points.
d) From Case A(ii)d), Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ), when D1 ≥ C, D2 ≤ C − (D1 − aOv,j1 ),
D1 − aOv,j1 < C, D1 − aOv,j1 > 0 and iff αD1 + βD2 − C − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
From Case D(ii)o, under same conditions as in Case A(ii)d), Rdi (R
b
j) > R
h
i (R
g
j )
iff αD1 + βD2 − C − αaOv,j1 < 0.
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However these two necessary conditions are opposite to each other and cannot
hold simultaneously. Hence, under the above conditions Rdi , R
d
j and R
b
i , R
b
j are
not Nash equilibrium points.
e) From Case A(ii)e), Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ), when D1 < C, D2 > C − (D1− aOv,j1 )⇒
D2 > C−D1,D1−aOv,j1 < C,D1−aOv,j1 > 0 and iff (α−1)D1−(α−β)aOv,j1 ≥ 0.
Under similar conditions, from Case D(ii)m, Rdi (R
b
j) > R
h
i (R
g
j ) when D2 −
aOv,j2 ≤ 0 and iff (1− α− β)D1 + βC + (α + β)aOv,j1 ≤ 0.
or, from Case D(ii)n, Rdi (R
b
j) > R
h
i (R
g
j ) whenD2−aOv,j2 > 0,D2−aOv,j2 > C−D1
and iff (1− α)(1 + β)D1 + (α− β)aOv,j1 − (1− α)βC ≥ 0.
However, from Case B(ii)f), Rbi(R
d
j ) > R
c
i (R
c
j) when D2 > C − D1, D1 < C,
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 ≥ C and iff − (1− β)C + (α− β)D1 ≤ 0.
From Case E(ii)a), when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 ≥ C, Rbi(Rdj ) = Rci (Rcj).
Checking the feasibility of the following equations from Cases A(ii)e and B(ii)f
using the Fourier-Motzkin elimination:
−D1 + C − yaOv,j1 ≤ 0 (B.3a)
D1 − C < 0 (B.3b)
−D1 + c−D2 < 0 (B.3c)
−D1 + aOv,j1 < 0 (B.3d)
D1 − C − aOv,j1 < 0 (B.3e)
−D1 + C −D2 + aOv,j1 < 0 (B.3f)
(α− β)D1 − (1− β)C ≤ 0 (B.3g)
(1− α)D1 + (α− β)aOv,j1 ≤ 0 (B.3h)
Multiplying equation (B.3d) with (1 − α) and adding to equation (B.3h) we
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get,
(1− β)aOv,j1 < 0
We know that (1− β) > 0 and aOv,j1 > 0. Thus, (1− β)aOv,j1 > 0.
Thus equations (B.3) are not feasible i.e when, Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ), Rdj (Rbi) 
Rcj(R
c
i ). Thus under these conditions R
d
i , R
d
j and R
b
i , R
b
j are not Nash equilib-
rium points.
f) From Case A(ii)f, Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ) when D1 − aOv,j1 > 0, D1 − aOv,j1 < C,
D2 > C− (D1−aOv,j1 )⇒ D2 > C−D1, D1 ≥ C and iff (α−β)(D1−aOv,j1 )−
(1− β)C ≥ 0.
From Case D(ii)l, Rdi (R
b
j) > R
h
i (R
g
j ) when D1 − aOv,j1 > 0, D1 − aOv,j1 < C,
D2 > C − (D1 − aOv,j1 ) ⇒ D2 > C − D1, D1 ≥ C and iff − (α − β)(D1 −
aOv,j1 ) + (1− β)C < 0.
Since all conditions including the necessary condition is the same for Cases
A(ii)f and D(ii)l, hence we can say that when Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ), Rdi (Rbj) >
Rhi (R
g
j ).
To check if, under the same conditions, when Rbi(R
d
j ) ≥ Rci (Rcj) and Rbi(Rdj ) ≥
Rli(R
k
j ).
From Case B(ii)d, when D1 ≥ C and D1 + yaOv,j1 ≥ C, Rbi(Rdj ) < Rci (Rcj) i.e.
when Rdi (R
b
j) ≥ Rai (Raj ) and Rdi (Rbj) > Rhi (Rgj ), Rbi(Rdj )  Rci (Rcj).
Thus, under these conditions Rdi , R
d
j and R
b
i , R
b
j are not Nash equilibrium points.
g) For all other instances of Case A i.e. Cases A(ii)g to A(ii)k, Rdi (R
b
j) < R
a
i (R
a
j )
and hence those are not explored.
Hence Lemma 5.3 is proved.
Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 5.4
To show that
When Rhi (R
g
j ) ≥ Rai (Raj ), Rhi (Rgj )  Rdi (Rbj) or vice versa.
Or
When Rhi (R
g
j ) ≥ Rai (Raj ) and Rhi (Rgj ) ≥ Rdi (Rbj), Rhj (Rgi )  Rlj(Rki ) and/or
Rhj (R
g
i )  Rej(Rei ).
1. When α ≤ αt
a) From Case C(i), Rhi (R
g
j ) > R
a
i (R
a
j ).
From Case D(i), Rhi (R
g
j ) < R
d
i (R
d
j ).
Hence, Rhi , R
h
j and R
g
i , R
g
j are not a Nash equilibrium points when α ≤ αt.
2. When α > αt
a) From Case C(ii)a, Rhi (R
g
j ) > R
a
i (R
a
j ) when D2 − aOv,j2 < 0 and D2 > C −
min(D1, C), D1 > C or D1 < C, D2 > 0 or D2 > C −D1, D2 > C or D2 < C.
• Considering that D1 < C, Case C(ii)a becomes Rhi (Rgj ) > Rai (Raj ) when
D2 − aOv,j2 < 0 and D2 > C −D1, D2 > C or D2 < C.
From Case D(ii)b, Rhi (R
g
j ) ≥ Rdi (Rbj) when D1 − aOv,j1 ≤ 0, D2 ≥ C,
D1 < C, D2 − aOv,j2 ≤ 0 and iff D1 − βC ≥ 0.
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From Case H(ii)b, Rgi (R
h
j ) < R
e
i (R
e
j) when D1 < C, D2 ≥ C − D1 ⇒
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 > C −D1.
Hence, when D1 < C ⇒ D2 > C − D1 (from Case C(ii)a), Rhi , Rhj and
Rgi , R
g
j are not a Nash equilibrium points.
• Considering that D1 > C, then Case C(ii)a becomes Rhi (Rgj ) > Rai (Raj )
when D2 − aOv,j2 < 0, D2 > 0 and D2 > C or D2 < C.
From Case D(ii)o, Rhi (R
g
j ) ≥ Rdi (Rbj) when D1− aOv,j1 > 0, D1− aOv,j1 < C,
D2 < C − (D1 − aOv,j1 ), D1 > C and iff αD1 + βD2 − C − αaOv,j1 ≥ 0.
From Case G(ii)g, Rgi (R
h
j ) < R
k
i (R
l
j) when D1 − (1 − y)aOv,j1 > 0 and
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 ≥ C ⇒ D1 > C.
Hence, under the above conditions, Rhi , R
h
j and R
g
i , R
g
j are not a Nash equi-
librium points.
b) From Case C(ii)c, Rhi (R
g
j ) > R
a
i (R
a
j ) when D2 − aOv,j2 > 0, D2 − aOv,j2 >
C −min(D1, C)⇒ D2 > C −min(D1, C)
• When D1 < C , Case C(ii)c becomes Rhi (Rgj ) > Rai (Raj ) when D2− aOv,j2 >
0, D2 − aOv,j2 > C −D1 ⇒ D2 > C −D1.
From Case H(ii)b, Rgi (R
h
j ) < R
e
i (R
e
j) when D1 < C, D2 ≥ C − D1 ⇒
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 > C −D1.
Thus, under these conditions, Rhi , R
h
j and R
g
i , R
g
j are not a Nash equilib-
rium points.
• When D1 > C
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c) From Case C(ii)d, Rhi (R
g
j ) ≥ Rai (Raj ) when D2 − aOv,j2 > 0, D2 − aOv,j2 <
C −D1 ⇒ D1 ≤ C, D2 > C −D1 and iff α(D2 − aOv,j2 )− (C −D1) ≥ 0.
From Case H(ii)b, Rgi (R
h
j ) < R
e
i (R
e
j) when D1 < C, D2 ≥ C − D1 ⇒ D2 +
aOv,j2 > C −D1.
Hence, under these conditions, Rhi , R
h
j and R
g
i , R
g
j are not a Nash equilibrium
points.
d) From Case C(ii)e, Rhi (R
g
j ) ≥ Rai (Raj ) when D2 − aOv,j2 > 0, D2 − aOv,j2 <
C −D1 ⇒ D1 ≤ C, D2 < C −D1 and iff (α− 1)D2 − αaOv,j2 ≥ 0.
Under similar conditions, Case H(ii)c states Rgi (R
h
j ) > R
e
i (R
e
j) when D1 < C,
D2 < C −D1, D2 + aOv,j2 ≥ C −D1 and iff αD2 − C +D1 < 0.
Applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination on equations C.1
−D2 + aOv,j2 < 0 (C.1a)
D2 − aOv,j2 − C +D1 < 0 (C.1b)
D1 − C ≤ 0 (C.1c)
D2 − C +D1 < 0 (C.1d)
−D2 − aOv,j2 + C −D1 < 0 (C.1e)
−(α− 1)D2 + αaOv,j2 < 0 (C.1f)
αD2 − C +D1 < 0 (C.1g)
Adding equations C.1e and C.1g, we get
(α− 1)D2 − aOv,j2 < 0
⇒ (α− 1)D2 < aOv,j2
⇒ (α− 1)D2 < αaOv,j2 , since α > 1
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⇒ (α− 1)D2 − αaOv,j2 < 0 which is in contradiction to equation C.1f.
Hence, equations C.1 are not feasible.
Thus, under these conditions, Rhi , R
h
j and R
g
i , R
g
j are not Nash equilibrium
points.
e) From Case C(ii)e, Rhi (R
g
j ) ≥ Rai (Raj ) when D2 − aOv,j2 > 0, D2 − aOv,j2 <
C −D1 ⇒ D1 ≤ C, D2 < C −D1 and iff (α− 1)D2 − αaOv,j2 ≥ 0.
Under similar conditions, Case H(ii)d states Rgi (R
h
j ) > R
e
i (R
e
j) when D1 < C,
D2 < C −D1, D2 + aOv,j2 < C −D1 and iff (α− 1)D2 − aOv,j2 < 0.
Applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination on equations C.2
−D2 + aOv,j2 < 0 (C.2a)
D2 − aOv,j2 − C +D1 < 0 (C.2b)
D1 − C ≤ 0 (C.2c)
D2 − C +D1 < 0 (C.2d)
D2 + a
Ov,j
2 − C +D1 < 0 (C.2e)
−(α− 1)D2 + αaOv,j2 < 0 (C.2f)
(α− 1)D2 − aOv,j2 < 0 (C.2g)
Adding equations C.2f and C.2g, we get
(α− 1)aOv,j2 < 0
However, we know that (α− 1) > 0 since α > 1 and aOv,j2 > 0
Hence (α− 1)aOv,j2 > 0
Thus equations C.2 are not feasible.
Thus, under these conditions, Rhi , R
h
j and R
g
i , R
g
j are not Nash equilibrium
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points.
Hence Lemma 5.4 is proved.
Appendix D
Proof of Lemma 5.5
To show that
When Rli(R
k
j ) ≥ Rci (Rcj), Rli(Rkj )  Rbi(Rdj ) or vice versa.
Or
WhenRli(R
k
j ) ≥ Rci (Rcj) andRli(Rkj ) ≥ Rbi(Rdj ), Rlj(Rki )  Rhj (Rgi ) and/orRlj(Rki ) 
Rej(R
e
i ).
1. When α ≤ αt
a) From Case E(i), Rli(R
k
j ) > R
b
i(R
d
j )
From Case F(i)a, Rli(R
k
j ) > R
c
i (R
c
j) iff min(D1, C)−βmin(D2, C−min(D1, C)) <
0.
From Case G(i), Rki (R
l
j) > R
g
i (R
h
j )
From Case I(i)a, Rki (R
l
j) > R
e
i (R
e
j) when D1 > C.
If D1 > C, then from the condition for Case F(i)a we get that C < 0.
However, we know that C ≥ 0.
Hence, under the above conditions, Rli, R
l
j and R
k
i , R
k
j are not a Nash equilib-
rium points.
b) From Case I(i)b, Rki (R
l
j) > R
e
i (R
e
j) when D1 < C, D2 > C −D1 and iff βC −
(1 + β)D1 < 0
When D1 > C and D2 > C −D1, from equations 5.14 and 5.50b we get,
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Rci = αpD1 + βp(C −D1)
Rli = pD1 + αβp(C −D1)
Rli −Rci = −(α− 1)pD1 + (α− 1)βp(C −D1)
⇒ Rli = Rci + (α− 1)p(βC − (1 + β)D1)
i.e. Rli > R
c
i iff βC − (1 + β)D1 ≥ 0
However, this condition contradicts the condition from Case I(i)b, i.e. when
Rki (R
l
j) > R
e
i (R
e
j), R
k
j (R
l
i)  Rcj(Rci ).
Hence, under the above conditions, Rli, R
l
j and R
k
i , R
k
j are not a Nash equilib-
rium points.
c) From I(i)c, Rki (R
l
j) > R
e
i (R
e
j) when D1 < C, D2 < C−D1 and iff βD2−D1 <
0.
From F(i), when D1 < C, D2 < C−D1, Rli(Rkj ) > Rci (Rcj) when βD2−D1 > 0.
However, this condition contradicts the condition from Case I(i)c, i.e. when
Rki (R
l
j) > R
e
i (R
e
j), R
k
j (R
l
i)  Rcj(Rci ).
Hence, under the above conditions, Rli, R
l
j and R
k
i , R
k
j are not a Nash equilib-
rium points.
2. When α > αt
a) From E(ii)a, Rbi(R
d
j ) = R
l
i(R
k
j ) when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 > C.
From F(ii)h, when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 > C & D1 > C, R
l
i(R
k
j ) < R
c
i (R
c
j).
Hence, under the above conditions, Rli, R
l
j and R
k
i , R
k
j are not a Nash equilib-
rium points.
b) From E(ii)a, Rbi(R
d
j ) = R
l
i(R
k
j ) when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 > C.
From F(ii)i, Rli(R
k
j ) > R
c
i (R
c
j) when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 > C, D1 < C,D2 > C − D1
and iff (α− β)D1 − (1− β)C < 0.
From I(ii)b, Rki (R
l
j) ≥ Rei (Rej) whenD1−(1−y)aOv,j1 < 0, D2+aOv,j2 > C, D1 <
C, D2 > C −D1 and iff (αβ − 1)D1 − (α− 1)βC ≥ 0.
However, from G(ii)b, under the same conditions as I(ii)b, Rki (R
l
j) < R
g
i (R
h
j ).
Hence, under the above conditions, Rli, R
l
j and R
k
i , R
k
j are not a Nash equilib-
rium points.
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c) From E(ii)a, Rbi(R
d
j ) = R
l
i(R
k
j ) when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 > C.
From F(ii)j,Rli(R
k
j ) > R
c
i (R
c
j), when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 > C, D1 < C, D2 < C −D1
& iff αD1 + βD2 − C < 0.
From I(ii)c, Rki (R
l
j) ≥ Rei (Rej , when D1−(1−y)aOv,j1 < 0, D2+aOv,j2 > C, D1 <
C, D2 < C −D1 & iff βC −D1 − αβD2 ≥ 0.
From G(ii)c, Rki (R
l
j) ≥ Rgi (Rhj ), when D1 − (1 − y)aOv,j1 < 0, D2 + aOv,j2 >
C, D1 < C, D2 < C −D1 & iff D1 + β(D2 − C) ≥ 0.
Applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination on equations D.1
αD1 + βD2 − C < 0 (D.1a)
−βC +D1 + αβD2 ≤ 0 (D.1b)
−D1 − β(D2 − C) ≤ 0 (D.1c)
Adding equations D.1b & D.1c we get,
β(α− 1)D2 < 0
However, since α > 1, 0 < β < 1 & D2 > 0, β(α− 1)D2 > 0.
Hence, under the above conditions, Rli, R
l
j and R
k
i , R
k
j are not a Nash equilib-
rium points.
d) From G(ii)e, Rgi (R
h
j ) > R
k
i (R
l
j) when D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 < C ⇒ D1 < C, D2 >
C −D1 ⇒ D2 > C −D1 − yaOv,j1 .
Thus, not considering Cases E(ii)b and E(ii)c, where the above conditions hold.
Hence, under the above conditions, Rli, R
l
j and R
k
i , R
k
j are not a Nash equilib-
rium points.
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e) From E(ii)e, Rli(R
k
j ) > R
b
i(R
d
j ) when
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 − C < 0 (D.2a)
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 +D2 − C < 0 (D.2b)
−D2 + aOv,j2 < 0 (D.2c)
−D1 − yaOv,j1 −D2 + C + aOv,j2 < 0 (D.2d)
α(D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 − C) +D2 < 0 (D.2e)
Applying Fourier Motzkin elimination to equations D.2b & D.2d,
aOv,j2 < 0
However we know that, aOv,j2 > 0
Hence E(ii)e is an invalid condition and not explored further.
f) From E(ii)f, Rli(R
k
j ) > R
b
i(R
d
j ), when
D1 + ya
Ov,j
1 − C < 0⇒ D1 − C < 0 (D.3a)
D2 − C +D1 + yaOv,j1 < 0⇒ D2 − C +D1 < 0 (D.3b)
−D2 + aOv,j2 < 0 (D.3c)
D2 − aOv,j2 − C +D1 + yOv,j1 < 0 (D.3d)
−(α− 1)D2 + αaOv,j2 < 0 (D.3e)
Similar condition in Case F exists at F(ii)d, where Rli(R
k
j ) > R
c
i (R
c
j) when all
the conditions in equation D.2 hold alongwith,
(α− 1)D1 − β(α− 1)D2 − yaOv,j1 + αβaOv,j2 < 0 (D.4)
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From G(ii)c, Rki (R
l
j) > R
g
i (R
h
j ) when,
D1 − (1− y)aOv,j1 < 0 (D.5a)
−D2 − aOv,j2 + c < 0 (D.5b)
D1 − C < 0 (D.5c)
D2 − C +D1 < 0 (D.5d)
−D1 − βD2 + βC < 0 (D.5e)
From I(ii)c, Rki (R
l
j) > R
e
i (R
e
j) when all the conditions in equation D.5 hold
alongwith,
− βC +D1 + αβD2 < 0 (D.6)
Applying Fourier Motzkin elimination to equations D.5e & D.6 we get,
β(α− 1)D2 < 0
However, since 0 < β < 1, α > 1 & D2 > 0, β(α− 1)D2 > 0.
Hence, under the above conditions, Rli, R
l
j and R
k
i , R
k
j are not a Nash equilib-
rium points.
g) Cases E(ii)d & E(ii)g are not considered since under those conditions Rli(R
k
j ) <
Rbi(R
d
j ).
Hence Lemma 5.5 is proved.
Appendix E
Proof of Lemma 5.7
5.7 i: To show that
When Rai ≥ Rdi , Raj ≥ Rbj
And / or
When Rai ≥ Rhi , Raj ≥ Rgj
We know that Rai = R
a
j , R
d
i = R
b
j and R
h
i = R
g
j .
Hence, Rai ≥ Rdi ≡ Raj ≥ Rbj and Rai ≥ Rhi ≡ Raj ≥ Rgj .
Hence Case a where both airlines follow Strategy 1 may be a Nash equilibrium
point.
5.7 ii: To show that
When Rci ≥ Rbi , Rcj ≥ Rdj
And / or
When Rci ≥ Rli, Rcj ≥ Rkj
We know that Rci = R
c
j, R
b
i = R
d
j and R
l
i = R
k
j .
Hence, Rci ≥ Rbi ≡ Rcj ≥ Rdj ; and Rci ≥ Rli ≡ Rcj ≥ Rkj .
Hence Case c where both airlines follow Strategy 2 may be a Nash equilibrium
point.
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5.7 iii: To show that
When Rei ≥ Rgi , Rej ≥ Rhj
And / or
When Rei ≥ Rki , Rej ≥ Rlj
We know that Rei = R
e
j , R
k
i = R
l
j and R
g
i = R
h
j .
Hence, Rei ≥ Rki ≡ Rej ≥ Rlj; and Rei ≥ Rgi ≡ Rej ≥ Rhj .
Hence Case e where both airlines follow Strategy 3 may be a Nash equilibrium
point.
Hence Lemma 5.7 is proved.
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